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I. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: THE DOCTRINE, ITS INCREASING
INCOHERENCE, AND ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE
A. Odes to “Employment At Will”: A Splintering Chorus
For a doctrine so universal, employment at will – in the words of the late,
great Rodney Dangerfield – “don’t get no respect.”1 The doctrine that employees
hold their jobs only “at [the employer’s] will” and have “no legal remedy for ‘an
employer’s unjustified decision to terminate”2 is the rule in all states except
Montana,3 despite California’s4 and New Hampshire’s5 brief flirtations with
1

Gene Colter, Moving the Market, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, DEC. 3, 2004, at C3 (describing an
accounting rule as “the Rodney Dangerfield of bookkeeping regulation: It don't get no respect.”).
2
Bammert v. Don's SuperValu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002) (citations omitted).
3
See infra notes 218, 220.
4
California briefly expanded “implied contract” rights so broadly that long-term employees
appeared protected against termination without just cause. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 385 (Cal. 1998) (recognizing an “implied contract” claim against termination without
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abandoning it. Even when courts admit this allows unfair terminations, they stick
to their guns: “The ‘antidote’ to the potential for unfairness in employment-atwill ‘is an employment contract’”6 requiring “just cause” for termination. The
state case law is filled with almost romantic odes to employment at will:
employment-at-will . . . is central to the free market economy and
“serves the interests of employees as well as employers” by maximizing
the freedom of both. . . . [It] inhibits judicial “second-guessing” of
discharge decisions – even those that are unfair, unfortunate, or harsh.7
employment-at-will . . . recognizes that employers need freedom to make
their own business judgments without interference from the courts.
“[A]n employer’s ability to make . . . independent assessments of an
employee[] . . . is essential to the free-enterprise system.”8
But the reality of the love affair is never as good as the lyrics; courts do not
show the uniform fealty to employment at will that they profess. Recent years
have seen a boomlet of employment-at-will exceptions, in the form of new
termination claims: common law doctrines against discharges violating “public
policy”9 or “implied covenants of good faith”;10 and expanded discrimination11
and whistleblower protection12 statutes. What recent years have not seen,
however, is the long-predicted death of employment at will.13 Many criticize the
cause, even absent express contract, based on “the personnel policies or practices of the employer,
the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting
assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry”). But the court quickly
narrowed Foley. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 342 (Cal. 2000) (“restrict[ing]”
Foley: “Absent other evidence of the employer’s intent, longevity, raises and promotions are their
own rewards for the employee’s continuing valued service; they do not, in and of themselves,
additionally constitute a contractual guarantee of future employment security”).
5
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) allowed a claim of unlawful termination
for rebuffing sexual advances, with broad language possibly repealing employment at will: “a
termination . . . of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract. . . . Such a rule affords the employee a certain stability of
employment.” Id. at 551-52. However, Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980)
limited Monge to “where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy
would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn.” Id. at 1274. This
limited “public policy” exception uncontroversially exists in many states. See infra Part II.A.1.
6
Bammert, 646 N.W.2d at 369 (citations omitted).
7
Id. (citations omitted).
8
Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tenn. 1997); see also infra note 28.
9
See infra Part II.A.1.
10
See infra Part II.A.3.
11
See infra note 290, 294.
12
See infra note 293.
13
See infra note 22.
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doctrine as unfair14 or argue that with so many termination claims, the exceptions
are swallowing the rule, practically forcing employers to show just cause for any
termination.15 Nonetheless, employment at will, “while it has eroded over the
years, still remains firmly anchored in the common law.”16
B. Exceptions to Employment at Will: Doctrinal Inconsistency Betraying
Judicial Ambivalence
Interestingly, there is little consistency to the case law limiting employment
at will. States haphazardly adopt some proposed exceptions while rejecting
others that similarly limit employers’ at-will discretion. More oddly, states cite
the same rationales to adopt and reject opposite sets of exceptions. Part II, a case
study of two states presenting an especially clear contrast,17 New York and
14

See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM.
BUS. L.J. 653, 685 (2000) (advocating a broad “abusive discharge tort” whenever “the employer
had a wrongful motive that interfered with employees’ personal rights . . . [in] areas of an
employee’s life in which his employer has no legitimate interest”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful
Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996) (“Just cause
protection is important not only in the majority of discharges that lie outside the ambit of wrongful
discharge doctrines, but also in those fewer but more troubling discharges that are covered by those
doctrines. Just cause protection provides a stronger foundation for the existing wrongful discharge
protections that are widely accepted.”); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1841, 1844 (1980)
(advocating “[a] good faith standard . . . after some reasonable period of satisfactory job
performance. . . . In the first year of employment only maliciously motivated discharges would be
considered to be in bad faith, but afterwards the broader good faith standard could be applied”).
15
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
115 (6th ed. 2003) (“While … the employer need not have a good reason to discharge as long as its
reason is not a prohibited one (e.g., race, sex, or age), the enactment of antidiscrimination statutes
tends toward a just cause rule: with African Americans, Caucasians, women, men older workers,
individuals with disabilities, etc., all free to challenge adverse decisions as discriminatory,
employers are well advised to have just cause.”); Samuel Estreicher, Human Behavior And The
Economic Paradigm At Work, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (“For employers, there are a sufficient
number of exceptions from the at-will rule . . . that it may be the wisest course to assume that
virtually all employment decisions will be subject to legal scrutiny.”); William R. Corbett, Waiting
For The Labor Law of The Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 261-62 (2002) (“Notwithstanding the daunting power the employment-at-will
doctrine supposedly bestows on employers, many insist that it is a myth, a ‘rule’ riddled with so
many exceptions that it cannot be relied upon. . . . [E]mployers must be careful about whom they
fire, why . . . , and how. . . . To prepare for possible litigation, employers must document
everything negative about employees[] . . . .”).
16
Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family
Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2001); see also
Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American
Labor Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 9 n.26 (1990) (“Recent state law departures from . . .
[employment at will] represent an exception, but these are highly uneven, generally quite limited,
and affect only a minority of workers.”).
17
While other articles examine employment at will with fifty-state surveys, a two-state case study
is superior for present purposes. Two states suffice to illustrate that strongly employment-at-will
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Wisconsin, illustrates this phenomenon of strongly employment-at-will states
adopting and rejecting opposite exceptions. Wisconsin recognizes a common
law claim of discharge in violation of public policy (e.g., firing whistleblowers)
but, citing adherence to employment at will, rejects common law employee
claims of employer fraud and implied covenants of good faith. In contrast, New
York rejects a general claim of discharge in violation of public policy, citing
adherence to employment at will, but recognizes employee claims of fraud and
implied covenants of good faith. Thus, one state accepts exception X to protect
employees while rejecting exception Y to maintain employment at will; yet on
the same rationales, the other state accepts Y while rejecting X. The striking
dissonance is characteristic of other states as well,18 and it is dragging
employment law “down the rabbit hole: a bizarre adventure where nothing is
what the Court says it is and circular reasoning passes for analysis.”19
The significance of this doctrinal chaos is twofold. First, state declarations
of “employment at will” do not help determine what claims will exist. When a
state rejects a claim “because of employment at will,” it really provides no reason
at all, given that it allows other similar claims; employment at will is a
conclusory label, not a rationale. Second, courts betray great ambivalence about
the doctrine by treating it so inconsistently. When courts reject a claim, they
insist that employment at will prevents them from creating a new employment
cause of action; yet when courts adopt a claim, they see it as no barrier.
As Part III discusses, inconsistent citation to the power of a major doctrine
betrays judicial ambivalence: discomfort adhering to a rigid rule; discomfort
rejecting it outright, and inability to find a well-conceptualized alternative. This
is a recurring phenomenon in constitutional law as well. Recently, the Court has
professed adherence to two expansive 1970s decisions on constitutional rights,
Roe v. Wade20 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.21 Yet the Court simultaneously has
states adopt and reject opposite sets of exceptions to the rule, and a two-state study can delve more
deeply into the case law; even the best fifty-state surveys, as superficial glosses on complex
common law, inevitably contain inaccuracies. E.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective
on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV.
837, 844-45 (1995) (erroneously stating (1) that New York law does not allow any “implied
covenant of good faith” claim to challenge a termination just before deferred compensation is due,
see discussion infra Part II.A.3 about such claims, and (2) that New Hampshire “appears to have
recognized an expansive version of the covenant that approaches a general good cause
requirement” in Monge, see discussion supra note 5 as to the substantial narrowing of Monge).
18
See infra note 127.
19
Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 827 (2003) (citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND CHAPTER ONE (Broadview Press Ltd. 2000)).
20
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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eviscerated those precedents, allowing extensive abortion restrictions (despite
Roe) and church-state intermingling (despite Lemon). These examples are
instructive because they have been so extraordinary and so extensively analyzed.
They show that what is happening to employment at will is not just quirky case
law. Rather, it is a common phenomenon in a doctrine’s evolution: when courts
start applying a doctrine inconsistently, that may herald a decline, but not a
rejection, of the doctrine; and if courts handle the decline badly, the outcome can
be doctrinal chaos. Accordingly, while it exaggerates to say that employment at
will’s growing exceptions presage its downfall,22 it equally exaggerates to say the
doctrine remains strong,23 given its increasing incoherence.
C. The Reform Agenda: A Coherent, Broad Range of Exceptions, Based on
Economic and Social Norm Theories
Part IV advocates redressing the incoherence of employment-at-will doctrine
with a realistic and well-theorized reform: providing a well-conceptualized basis
for an expansive range of exceptions, without jettisoning the basic doctrine.
Simple fairness or unconscionability arguments are too indeterminate to provide
a principled basis for picking and choosing among exceptions, so Part IV
suggests a two-part theoretical basis for recognizing exceptions: the limits of
social norm theory, plus a broad economic conception of the “public interest.”
Social norms, recent scholarship has argued, are powerful protectors of
fairness that make employment lawsuits unnecessary; but a careful analysis of
how social norms operate distinguishes settings, like employment, where social
norms are too weak to substitute for lawsuits. As to economic theory, the most
recognized exceptions to employment at will are justified by a broad economic
conception of the “public interest”: protecting against negative externalities (i.e.,
effects on third parties), as well as protecting against the risk of opportunism
inherent in employment relationships that, because they extend over time,
involve sequential performance by employer and employee. Courts to date have
recognized an inconsistent mix of some but not other employment claims; they
can use this more theoretically sound approach to retain employment at will
while also recognizing a number of related employee claims.
II. Inconsistent Exceptions to a Supposedly Strong At-Will Rule: A Two22

Compare, e.g., Ballam, supra note 14, at 687 (“[C]urrent trends . . . suggest that employers soon
will no longer be able to terminate employees for no cause. . . . The future of employment-at-will,
then, is that it has no future.”) with Estlund, supra note 14,at 1688 (“[S]tories of the demise of
employment at will are greatly exaggerated. . . . The argument that wrongful discharge law has
eviscerated employment at will is simply overstated.”).
23
E.g., Horn v. New York Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003) (“While the twentieth century
featured significant statutory inroads into . . . at-will employment, . . . courts have proved chary of
creating common-law exceptions to the rule and reluctant to expand any exceptions.”); see also
infra notes 24, 26.
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State Case Study
To illustrate the common law dissonance among the states, this Part presents
a two-state case study of three major common-law employee claims: termination
in violation of public policy; fraudulent inducement of employees by employers;
and terminations breaching implied covenants of good faith. The two states
analyzed, New York and Wisconsin, are merely one pair of states presenting an
especially clear contrast, because both profess strong adherence to employment
at will but do not agree on how that applies to any of the three claims. This
interstate inconsistency is present in other states as well, leaving employment at
will an incoherent doctrine badly in need of reform.
A. Opposing Sets of Common Law Claims in New York and Wisconsin
Like most states, New York and Wisconsin decidedly espouse employment
at will. New York’s high court, the New York Court of Appeals, insists that
since the nineteenth century, it has “exhibited a strong disinclination to alter the
traditional rule of at-will employment”24:
The traditional American common-law rule undergirding employment
relationships, which we adopted in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148
N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), is the presumption that employment for an
indefinite or unspecified term is at will and may be freely terminated by
either party at any time without cause or notice.25
Wisconsin’s high court, tracing its own employment-at-will rule back even
further,26 uses language just as categorical as New York’s: “In the absence of
contrary statutory or contract provisions, an employer may discharge his
employees for any reason without incurring liability.”27 Other states have
similarly strong and flowery pronouncements about the history and continued
vitality of employment at will.28
24

Horn, 790 N.E.2d at 756.
Id. at 755, 759.
26
Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369-70 (Wis. 2002) (“The employment-atwill doctrine is a ‘stable fixture’ of our common law, and has been since 1871.”) (citations
omitted).
27
Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 389, 394 n.16 (Wis. 1974) (collecting
cases).
28
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v.
Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808 (Va. 1996) (“An employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave his
employment for any reason. . . . Notions of fundamental fairness . . . extend[] a corresponding
freedom to the employer.”); Wisehart v. Meganck, 66 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[A]t-will
employment . . . restrains courts from inquiring into the basis for termination and advances the
value of a free market.”); Horn v. New York Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 765 (N.Y. 2003) (“This
State's interest in protecting both the employer's and the employee's freedom of contract undergirds
the employment-at-will doctrine.”); Tolliver v. Concordia Waterworks Dist. No. 1, 735 So.2d 680,
25
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Despite their categorical-sounding assertions of the vitality and desirability
of the employment-at-will rule, both states’ laws feature substantial exceptions to
that rule. Each state’s exceptions, however, are inconsistent with the other
state’s, leaving each state with the apparent view that employment at will allows
its own exceptions but forbids the other state’s. As discussed in subpart (1)
below, Wisconsin has a common law cause of action for termination in violation
of any public policy established by the text or spirit of any law. New York, in
contrast, rejects any such common law rule, and the New York legislature
ultimately adopted an extraordinarily narrow whistleblower statute so widely
acknowledged as impotent that it has become virtually a dead letter. As
discussed in subpart (2), New York law does feature certain other employmentat-will exceptions based on employer bad faith: either defrauding employees into
coming to or continuing work, or terminating employees just before they become
entitled to certain lump-sum compensation. Wisconsin law, however, has
accepted almost no such claims, with the exception of a narrow “fraud” claim
that is restricted to new hires, but unavailable for incumbent employees. Finally,
as discussed in subpart (3), Wisconsin flatly rejects any “implied covenant” claim
protecting employees from being terminated just before deferred compensation is
due. New York law, in contrast, is thoroughly incoherent, with New York state
courts appearing to reject such claims, federal courts regularly recognizing those
same sorts of claims under New York law, and no courts or scholars even
appearing to notice this stark federal-state dissonance as to New York law.
1. “Public Policy” Claims: Termination for Complying with Law
In many states, courts recognize a public policy exception to the employmentat-will doctrine.29 Typically, employees can challenge terminations on public policy
grounds by proving that the employer (1) intentionally required the employee to
perform an illegal act or prevented the employee from exercising a public duty or
right, (2) did so in violation of an established public policy, and (3) fired the
employee for refusing to accede to its wishes.30 As discussed below, Wisconsin has
a robust “public policy” claim of this sort, while New York courts consistently have
rejected such common law claims.
a. Wisconsin: Adoption of a Common Law Claim
In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,31 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
682 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or
family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to depart.”).
29
See, e.g., Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
30
See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Oxford,
743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
31
335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
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established a “public policy” exception to the employment-at-will rule: “an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is
contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by
existing law.”32 The court insisted that it was refusing to modify employment at
will with an employer duty to terminate at-will employees only in good faith.
Yet the court’s language indicated that this new claim was a limited version of an
implied duty of good faith, in that the court viewed the claim as arising from
employers’ “implied covenants” not to undertake certain unlawful actions:
[D]eclarations of public policy are inherently incorporated into every
employment at will relationship[,]33 . . . predicated on the breach of an
implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for
refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy.34
Sometimes, when a state establishes a new cause of action, later decisions
limit it to those particular facts;35 but in Wisconsin, later decisions expanded the
public policy claim to various settings. Although Brockmeyer indicated that the
source of the “public policy” must be a Wisconsin “constitutional or statutory
provision,”36 later cases held that the source instead can be an administrative
rule,37 federal law,38 or merely a law’s “spirit” and “intent” (i.e., not the text).39
Recent cases have established that the public policy claim protects not only
employee whistleblowing, but also employee refusals to participate in workplace
safety violations; for example, employers cannot fire employees for refusing to
drive without a required license40 or refusing to violate doctor’s orders by
returning to work early after a hospitalization.41 The latter case shows the
breadth of the public policy claim: the only state law providing any relevant
public policy was statutory and regulatory language prohibiting work hours
32

Id. at 840.
Id. at 838
34
Id. at 841.
35
See infra Part II.A.1.b (discussing New York’s Wieder v. Skala).
36
335 N.W.2d at 840.
37
Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 483 N.W.2d 211, 212 (Wis. 1992) (holding that an
administrative rule suffices if it evidences a “fundamental and well-defined public policy”).
38
Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443 (Wis. 2000).
39
Wandry v. Bull’s Eye Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Wis. 1986) (noting also that the law
providing the public policy need not specifically state that it protects employees from termination).
40
Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Wis. 1997). Kempfer's employer
required him to drive a truck for which he needed a commercial driver’s license he lacked – and
ultimately fired him for refusing to drive without the license. The court held that Wis. Stat. §
343.05(2)(a), which sets forth the minimum requirements for a person operating a commercial
vehicle, sufficiently constituted a fundamental and well-defined public policy. Id. at 695.
41
Wilcox v. Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992).
33
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“dangerous or prejudicial to the [employee’s] life, health, safety or welfare”;42
the law neither mandated any particular hours nor provided a private right to sue,
but it sufficiently established a public policy for the employee to claim his
termination violated that law.43 Wisconsin courts continue to insist that the
public policy claim is a “narrow” one,44 but that just means that courts refuse to
broaden the claim into a generalized employee right to do anything lawful. For
example, courts have rejected public policy claims by employees fired for
refusing to participate in a pension plan,45 being unable to work their assigned
hours,46 or refusing to sign the employer’s non-competition agreement
(Wisconsin does not ban all such agreements, only overbroad ones).47
While this public policy claim is well established, a recent case illustrates
how arbitrarily Wisconsin draws lines based on its perception of employment at
will. Bammert v. Don’s SuperValu48 rejected the claim of an employee fired in
retaliation for his spouse’s actions.49 The court’s rationale was little more than a
generalized ode to employment at will,50 which just begs the question: why does
employment at will allow some but not other of the various common law claims
that all limit the employer’s broad at-will prerogative to fire for any reason?
b. New York: Rejecting Common Law Claims, Then Adopting
Wholly Ineffectual Statute
New York is among the small minority of states not recognizing a “public
policy” exception to employment at will.51 The state’s high court has long
42

Wis. Stat. § 103.02.
After Mr. Wilcox had worked 35 hours on Thursday and Friday to fix a malfunctioning computer
system, he left at 9:30 p.m. Friday due to angina pains. Shortly thereafter on Friday night, his
manager called him at home to tell him to report to work on Saturday and Sunday or be fired;
Wilcox responded by assuring him the computer system would be up and running when it was
needed, on Wednesday. Wilcox was hospitalized later Friday evening and released on Saturday
with instructions to take it easy, which led him to choose not to work on Saturday or Sunday.
Although the computer system was running on Wednesday, the company fired him anyway on
Wednesday, citing his “poor management style.” Wilcox, 965 F.2d at 357-58.
44
E.g., Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Wis. 2002).
45
Schultz v. Production Stamping Equip., 434 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Wis. 1989).
46
Scarpace v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Wis. 1983).
47
Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 225 (1998). (“Were we to apply the
Brockmeyer exception to the facts of this case, at-will employees could indiscriminately decline to
sign non-disclosure/non-compete agreements which in their own minds are ‘unreasonable’ and
subsequently bring a wrongful discharge claim if terminated for doing so.”).
48
646 N.W.2d 365.
49
Id. at 370-71 (“Discharges for conduct outside of the employment relationship by someone other
than the discharged employee are not actionable under present law.”).
50
See supra notes 2, 6, 7, 26.
51
Accord Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Del. 1997) (rejecting aBrockmeyer type claim under Delaware law).
43

WHERE THERE’S AT-WILL, THERE ARE MANY WAYS

11

“exhibited a strong disinclination to alter the traditional rule of at-will
employment”52 and, based on that principle, has “consistently declined to create a
common law tort of wrongful or abusive discharge, or to recognize a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to imply terms grounded in a conception of public
policy into employment contracts.”53
The New York Court of Appeals definitively shut the door to a public policy
discharge cause of action in the first twenty words of its decision rejecting such a
claim in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.:54 “This court has not and
does not now recognize a cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful
discharge.”55 This was not a case of bad facts leading to anomalous law;
Murphy’s facts would have supported a public policy cause of action quite
strongly, had the court any inclination to allow such a claim. Mr. Murphy
alleged that he was fired for refusing to participate in massive, Enron-like illegal
pension/accounting fraud and for making required reports of those illegalities.56
After Murphy, the New York Court of Appeals only once has opened the
door to a public policy whistleblowing claim, and it has since narrowed that
claim almost out of existence. Wieder v. Skala57 recognized an implied covenant
of good faith that a law firm associate could not be fired for complying with legal
ethics rules, but the court indicated that this doctrine might be limited to its facts:
“It is in this distinctive relationship between a law firm and a lawyer hired as an
associate that plaintiff finds the implied-in-law obligation on which he founds his
claims.”58 Plaintiffs’ lawyers pounced on Wieder, sensing an opening for a
broad-based public policy exception to employment at will.59 But the New York
52

Horn v. New York Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003) (“The traditional American
common-law rule undergirding employment relationships, which we adopted in Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co. . . . (1895), is the presumption that employment for an indefinite or unspecified
term is at will and may be freely terminated by either party at any time without cause or notice.”).
53
Id. at 759.
54
448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
55
Id. at 87.
56
“Plaintiff claims that he was fired … because of his disclosure to top management of alleged
accounting improprieties on the part of corporate personnel…. [P]laintiff asserts that his firing was
in retaliation for his revelation to officers and directors … [of] at least $50 million in illegal
account manipulations of secret pension reserves which improperly inflated the company's growth
in income and allowed high-ranking officers to reap unwarranted bonuses … , as well as in
retaliation for his own refusal to engage in the alleged accounting improprieties. He contends that
the company's internal regulations required him to make the disclosure that he did.” Id.
57
609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
58
Id. at 108.
59
For examples of such litigation, see infra notes 77-81; see also Sandra J. Mullings, Wieder v.
Skala: A Chink In The Armor Of The At-Will Doctrine Or A Lance For Law Firm Associates?, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 963, 964 (1995) (noting, shortly after Wieder, that the court’s opinion “is so
replete with language of limitation and qualification that it suggests the Court intended its holding
to encompass only law firm associates who find themselves in Wieder's precise circumstances.
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courts have crushed that effort, confining Wieder to lawyers complying with ethics
rules and refusing to apply it to any other context. With the sole exception of one
lawyer in the exact same situation as Mr. Wieder surviving a lower court motion to
dismiss,60 in every subsequent reported case, courts have rejected Wieder claims:
• A non-attorney who reported a money laundering scheme failed when he
argued “that the exception to the ‘at will’ employment doctrine . . . for
licensed attorneys should be extended to securities dealers and ‘most
probably, to any licensed business or profession whose continued
practice is subject to compliance with laws or regulations governing the
conduct of such business or profession.’”61
• A Chief Financial Officer fired for refusing to falsify taxes “does not fit
within the limited exception . . . set forth in Wieder.”62
• A doctor terminated for refusing to provide patients’ confidential medical
information to unauthorized nonmedical personnel also failed to establish
a Wieder claim, the New York Court of Appeals held.63
The case law is filled with rejections of Wieder claims for other occupations,64 and

However, the core of the opinion, the Court's pronouncement of an implied limitation on the
employer's right to terminate based on extrinsic ethical standards, is quite broad. The potential
scope of this limitation, together with the Court's failure to fully articulate the principles underlying
the holding, will, at the least, provide fertile ground for litigation by other professionals.”).
60
Lichtman v. Estrin, 282 A.D.2d 326, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (reversing dismissal where
plaintiff, a law firm associate, was told by his supervisor that “even if he were suspended or
disbarred, he could continue his involvement in his law practice by ‘coming into the office at night’
and meeting his associates for ‘lunch.’ Plaintiff advised Estrin that the Disciplinary Rules . . .
would prohibit him from any involvement in the practice of law if he were suspended or disbarred,
and Estrin replied, ‘I can have lunch with a friend, can't I?’ Plaintiff commented that it was this
attitude that got Estrin into trouble in the first place.”).
61
Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 623 N.Y.S.2d 560, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“We
disagree with that expansive construction of Wieder.”).
62
Leibowitz v. Party Experience, Inc., 650 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
63
Horn v. New York Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 753-54 (N.Y. 2003) (“At issue in this appeal is
whether the narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine adopted in Wieder …
encompasses a physician employed by a nonmedical employer. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that it does not and decline to expand the Wieder exception to do so.”).
64
See, e.g., DeFilippo v. Xerox Corp., 636 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (rejecting
“Plaintiff's attempt to have us fashion a new exception to the well-established rule permitting an
employer to discharge an at-will employee at any time and for whatever reason due to the duties and
responsibilities imposed upon him as a sales professional” based on Wieder); Haviland v. J. Aron &
Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (retail jewelry); Kelleher v. Corinthian Media, Inc.,
617 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Luck v. Mazzone, 52 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1995) (state
court employee); McConchie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 273 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(pharmacist); Fry v. McCall, 945 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (state deputy comptroller employee).
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even for lawyers in only marginally different circumstances than Mr. Wieder.65
While the New York Court of Appeals repeatedly has justified its refusal to
recognize a common law public policy claim as a matter of judicial deference
based on separation of powers – “such recognition must await action of the
Legislature”66 – the New York legislature has not exactly risen to the challenge.
New York’s “whistleblower” statute, New York Labor Law Section 740, “is
probably the most restrictive and arcane” among the states,67 “provid[ing] very
limited protection for employees who blow the whistle on employer misconduct
thatboth (i) violates a law, rule, or regulation and (ii) creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”68 Those requirements
are strict: a claim (i) “must be premised on an actual violation of law, rule or
regulation; a reasonable belief of a violation is not enough,” 69 as it is under most
anti- retaliation statutes;70 and (ii) must involve whistleblowing about “a
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety,” not just any
illegality. Accordingly, employees are unprotected when blowing the whistle on
most unlawful (even criminal) activities, such as financial fraud, misuse of
medical records, and defrauding the government.71 “Given the narrowness of this
65

Geary v. Hunton & Williams, 257 A.D.2d 482, 483 (N.Y. App. Div.1999) (rejecting claim by
attorney alleging termination after he complained about a partner’s improper billing practices,
because plaintiff reported the misconduct only internally within his law firm, and “neither reported
the partner to the Disciplinary Committee, expressed to defendant an intention to make such a
report, nor believed that he personally was obligated to make such a report”).
66
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983); see also Horn, 790
N.E.2d at 756-57 (citing with approval Murphy’s argument that employment protections must come
from the legislature, not the courts).
67
Wayne N. Outten, et al., Overview Of Workplace Claims in New York: Perspective of Employees'
Counsel, 662 PLI/LITIG. 1179, 1210 (Oct. 2001).
68
Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
69
Rotwein v. Sunharbor Manor Residential Health Care Facility, 695 N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999); see also Capobianco v. Am. Stock Exch., 649 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(finding that plaintiff failed to show that the complaint about asbestos removal involved an "actual"
violation of the law); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding
that nuclear reactor employee's reasonable belief that there was a radiation leak was insufficient
because § 740 requires an actual violation of law, rule or regulation, not mere belief that violation
has occurred), aff'd, 644 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1996).
70
Under most anti-discrimination and whistleblower laws, the employee “remains protected so
long as the employee reasonably and in good faith believed that unlawful discrimination was
occurring. Protection will be denied only if the employee's professed belief that discrimination
occurred is so far from the mark that ‘[n]o reasonable person could have believed that the [conduct]
. . . violated Title VII[].’” Wayne N. Outten, et al., When Your Employer Thinks You Acted
Disloyally: The Guarantees and Uncertainties of Retaliation Law, 693 PLI/LIT. 151, 155-57
(2003); see also Laurence S. Moy, et al., Whistleblower Claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 1443 PLI/CORP. 193, 204 (2004) (noting that under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “retaliation against
a whistleblowing employee can be illegal even if the employee’s reports of corporate misconduct
turn out to be unfounded. The Act only requires . . . ‘reasonable belief’ of illegal activity”).
71
Rotwein v. Sunharbor Manor Residential Health Care Facility, 695 N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (N.Y.
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protection, plaintiffs rarely have been able to succeed under § 740”;72 only when
the unlawful activity is literally a life-or-death matter73 does an employee have
any chance of statutory protection.74
Sup. Ct. 1999) (opposing Medicare billing improprieties did not involve immediate threat to public
health and safety; collecting cases noting that neither do “fraudulent billing practices,” “fiscal
improprieties,” “disclosure of medical records,” or “fraudulent banking activities”).
72
Outten, Overview of Workplace Claims, supra note 67,at 1210.
73
See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Cornell Univ. Med. Coll., 702 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(reversing grant of summary judgment to employer where employee, a doctor, reported a hospital
burn center colleague behaving in mentally disturbed manner and providing “questionable
treatment”); Rogers v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (noting
“numerous actual violations”: “paramedics pronounced a live woman dead without examining her
or attempting resuscitation, attempted to cover up a second call to the same location, did not
transport the critically ill patient to the closest hospital, and engaged in improper resuscitation. . . .
The risk of death or injury to patients attended by negligent, poorly trained, and undisciplined EMS
paramedics is . . . [a] public health risk. . . . [T]he danger posed by the recurrence of a mishandled
EMS call clearly meets the required threat to public health and safety.”); Granser v. Box Tree South
Ltd., 623 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that violations creating fire hazards
sufficiently threatened public health and safety for § 740 claim); Rosario v. Nat'l Housing
Partnership Prop. Management, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4633 (BSJ), 1998 WL 146207 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
1998) (threatened complaint regarding living conditions at housing project supported § 740 claim).
74
New York provides different whistleblower protection for certain jobs. Most notably, New
York Civil Service Law § 75-b, for public sector employees, is broader than § 740 in that it “does
not require that the violation … pose a threat to health or safety, or that the violation be ‘actual’ –
i.e., the plaintiff's reasonable belief that an ‘improper governmental action’ has occurred will
suffice.” Outten, Overview of Workplace Claims, supra note 67,at 1212. Yet in other respec ts, §
75-b is narrower than § 740: under § 75-b(2)(a), protection “applies to information reported within
government only … [and] does not provide any protections against retaliation for public employees
who disclose governmental misconduct or perceived misconduct to … the media” or make other
informal or public complaints. William A. Herbert, Protections For Public Employees Who ‘Blow
The Whistle’ Appear To Be Inadequate, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 20 (2004). Also, employees are
protected only if, before complaining to an external agency (e.g., an environmental protection
agency), they formally complained internally, to officials in their own agency. § 75-b(2)(b)
(requiring that for external complaints to be protected, employees must “have made a good faith
effort to provide the appointing authority . . . the information to be disclosed and shall provide . . .
a reasonable time to take appropriate action unless there is imminent and serious danger”).
These limits on § 75-b are strictly enforced: employees have lost when they made the requisite
internal and external complaints but did not wait “a reasonable time” after the internal complaint.
See Garrity v. Univ. at Albany, 301 A.D.2d 1015, 1017 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (affirming dismissal
where pharmacist reported prescription record-keeping deficiencies to police and state authorities
“‘the next day’ after [complaining to supervisors, which] . . . did not afford petitioner’s superiors a
reasonable time to investigate and correct the problems” (citing § 75-b(2)(b)). Employees also
have lost when their internal complaint was too informal and was made to the “wrong” officer. See
Brohman v. New York Convention Ctr. Oper. Corp., 293 A.D.2d 299, 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(affirming dismissal where “Plaintiff admittedly had no communications with either defendant's
Board . . . or [high] officer[s], but argues that his communications with one of defendant's vicepresidents satisfied the pre-disclosure notice requirement. . . . [Plaintiff’s] communications with
the vice-president were not for the purpose of informing defendant of its president's improper
governmental actions. . . . [H]e used the vice-president as a ‘friend and a soundboard,’ went to him
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Thus, employees in New York enjoy virtually no protection against
discharges that subvert “public policy.” They have no common law protection
(except attorneys in rare circumstances); they have statutory protection only for
whistleblowing (not for refusing to violate the law, nor for complying with legal
duties), but under a statute so narrow that it almost never applies. New York has
justified this state of affairs as a necessary corollary to the employment-at-will
rule, even as Wisconsin does not see that same rule as a barrier to a robust
common law rule against terminations violating a wide array of public policy.
2. “Fraudulent Inducement” Claims: Defrauding Employees into Their
Jobs
Under an “employment at will” regime, employees cannot sue just because
they are dissatisfied with their pay, duties, or working conditions. But what
about an employee’s claim that the employer lied to her about what her pay or
working conditions would be? In such circumstances, the employee may claim
that she was induced to work for the employer by lies about her pay, duties, or
working conditions. Under black-letter tort law, the employee may have a fraud
claim that her employment relationship “was induced by false representations.”75
The damages for such a fraud claim may be limited to reliance damages (the cost
of taking the job or foregoing another job opportunity), but those may be sizeable
in the context of ongoing compensation and missed opportunities.
Once again, New York, the state so strictly adhering to employment at will
that it disallows any meaningful claim for discharges violating public policy,
allows a much broader range of fraudulent inducement claims than Wisconsin,
the state far more liberally allowing public policy claims. In New York, any
employee can sue for fraud by alleging that the employer used misrepresentations
to induce him or her to take or keep a job. In Wisconsin, however, the courts
construe employment at will as precluding any fraud claim by employees once
they start working – a substantial restriction on who can bring such claims.
a. Wisconsin: No Claim for Employees, Only for Job Candidates
In Wisconsin, employees can sue for being defrauded into accepting a job –
but not for being defrauded into remaining at a job (e.g., with a promise of a
promotion, raise, transfer, change in duties, etc.). This limitation means that
employees have no protection against employer fraud during their employment,
such as employer misrepresentations inducing them to stay on the job or turn
down another offer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court so held in Mackenzie v.
for ‘advice,’ did not ask him to put an end to the alleged improprieties, and had a mutual
understanding . . . their conversations would ‘absolutely’ go no further”). Thus, § 75-b protection
“remains inadequate, and may not be sufficient to allay the natural and inherent fear of reprisal felt
by most employees.” Herbert, supra, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. at 20.
75
Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Miller Brewing Co.,76 reasoning that “those who are party to an at-will contract
must seek recourse in contract rather than tort law,” which is to say that at-will
employees without employment contract protections lack any recourse at all.77
There, the plaintiff claimed that, amidst a corporate downsizing, his employer
defrauded him into remaining with the company by not disclosing that his
position had been downgraded.78 The court refused to undercut employment at
will with a common law fraudulent inducement claim, “because such a cause of
action would have a profound effect on potentially millions of employees.”79
The extent to which the Mackenzie court feared upsetting the employment-atwill rule is noteworthy in two respects. First, the court went so far as to create an
at-will immunity to a general, well-established tort cause of action, just to protect
employers from liability to at-will employees.80 Second, the court’s trepidation
about tinkering with employment at will led it to exaggerate substantially the
limited impact of this claim. As to effects on “millions”: at the time, 2.854
million people were employed in Wisconsin.81 Yet far from all of those were “atwill” employees; many government workers,82 union members,83 and others (e.g.,
76

623 N.W.2d 739 (Wis. 2001).
Id. at 739, 742.
78
Id. at 741.
79
Id. at 745.
80
The lengthy majority opinion boils down to adopting this rule . . . : When an employer
deliberately and intentionally lies to an at-will employee to induce the employee to
continue employment and the employee continues to work relying on those lies, and then
sustains damages as a result . . . , the employee cannot sue in a tort action for damages . . .
. Wisconsin's general rule of law is that everyone is liable for damages for intentional
misrepresentation. The majority opinion carves out an exception to this general rule and
states that employers are not liable to at-will employees for damages for intentional
misrepresentation. It's one thing to say that the elements of the tort of intentional
misrepresentation have not been met in the present case. I therefore concur. It's entirely
another thing to say . . . that the tort of intentional misrepresentation never applies in an
employment- at-will relationship.
Id. at 750 (Abrahamson, C.J. & Bablitch, J., concurring).
81
Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population by sex,
age, race, and Hispanic origin, 2001 annual averages,” page 61 of 62 (Wisconsin statistics),
available at http://www.bls.gov/lau/table12full01.pdf. (Statistics are for 2001 because that was the
year Mackenzie was decided.)
82
In 2000, Wisconsin’s workforce included 413,700 government workers. “Bureau of Labor
Statistics, State and Area Employment, Hours, and Earnings” (statistics on government workers in
Wisconsin), available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv.
83
See Steven L. Willborn, Workers in Troubled Firms: When Are (Should) They Be Protected?, 7
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 35, 37 n.8 (2004) (noting that nationally, “ninety-seven percent of union
contracts require cause or just cause for discharge”). In 2001, 17.9% of “nonagricultural workers”
(a category that includes but is not limited to government workers) in Wisconsin were union
members. Barry T. Hirsch et al., “Estimates of union density by State,” Monthly Labor Review 5155 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, July 2001), at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/07/ressum2.pdf.
With total “nonfarm” employment in 2000 at 2.8338 million (close to total employment, so there
77
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white-collar workers)84 have some job security through protections in civil
service law, collective bargaining agreements,85 and employment contracts.86
Also, there would be no effect (much less a “profound” one) on any employees
without fraudulent inducement claims. There is no basis for the hyperbole that
recognizing fraudulent inducement claims would impact “millions.”
Mackenzie followed, and confirmed the narrow scope of, a prior decision
allowing an at-will employee to claim fraudulent inducement. In Hartwig v.
Bitter, 87 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found actionable an employer’s preemployment misrepresentations (mostly about hot prospects for deals) to a job
candidate to induce him to take the job.88 The court allowed the claim “because
no employment relationship existed at the time of the misrepresentations.”89
were few “farm” workers exclude from these figures), over 500,000 of Wisconsin’s employees
were union workers who likely enjoyed at least some job protections taking them out of the pure
employment-at-will rule the court feared upsetting.
84
Verkerke, supra note 17, at 867 (1995) (surveying non-union employment and finding that “more
than one in seven (15%) contract expressly for just cause protection”).
85
See, e.g., Willborn, supra note 83,at 37 (2004) (“For union workers, ... collective bargaining
contracts almost uniformly require employers to have ‘just cause’ to discharge employees”; citing
data “that ninety-seven percent of union contracts require cause or just cause for discharge”).
86
See, e.g., Coelho v. Posi-Seal Intern., Inc., 544 A.2d 170 (Conn. 1988) (affirming verdict for
discharged employee who “contended that he had been terminated as a result of his disputes with
the director of manufacturing and that the reduction in force was a mere pretext for discharging him
… a reduction in force may be a pretext for a termination in violation of an … agreement not to
discharge an employee without just cause”).
87
139 N.W.2d 644 (1966).
88
Id. at 646. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant gave them “a list of ‘prospects’ and stated
that those persons were in fact interested in buying or selling business enterprises.” Id. The
plaintiffs also claimed that “the defendant represented to Hartwig and Wendt that the sales to these
persons would result in earning large sums of money.” Id. Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the
defendant told them that “he was closing sales ‘right along.’” Id. The plaintiffs alleged that “the
persons on the ‘prospect’ list were not interested in buying or selling a business.” Id. Furthermore,
they asserted “that the defendant knew that his representations as to future earnings were false.” Id.
The court found that these statements could constitute fraud because, even “though a matter
asserted is an opinion, it is actionable if the maker is aware of present facts incompatible with that
opinion.” Id. The court held that a “statement of opinion in a business transaction [based] upon
facts not disclosed or otherwise known to the recipient may reasonably be interpreted as an implied
statement that the maker knows of no fact incompatible with his opinion.” Id. Consequently, if,
“at the time of the assertion, the utterer is aware of facts that are incompatible with his opinion or if
he has [no] intent to perform in the future, the fraud is in praesenti.” Id.
89
Id. at 647. The Court said that a “closer question is presented by the allegation that Hartwig and
Wendt were falsely told they would earn large sums of money.” Id. If the defendant was only
“‘puffing’ the potential of the employment,” it would not be actionable. Id. However, the
statement was actionable in this case because “the defendant knew that nine previous salesman over
a period of four years had grossed commissions not in excess of $752.50. Hence, . . . the
defendant, who was in a unique position to know the facts, was aware of facts that were
incompatible with his representations in regard to the future. This allegation states a cause of
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Mackenzie confirms this curious distinction: pre-employment misrepresentations
are actionable, but during-employment misrepresentations are not.90 One would
think that employers have more duties to their own employees than to strangers,
yet the court sees employment at will as commanding otherwise: employers
freely can defraud employees, but not mere job candidates. Moreover, this
strong adherence to employment at will came from the same court that crafted a
substantial common law public policy exception,91 indicating that the court
selectively and inconsistently decides whether employment at will precludes a
common law claim.
b. New York: A Strong Claim for Employees and Candidates Alike
New York strongly recognizes employee fraudulent inducement claims, and
despite the state’s purported strong adherence to employment at will, courts in
the state identically recognize claims by new and incumbent employees alike, in
stark contrast to Wisconsin law. Stewart v. Jackson & Nash,92 the leading case
recognizing such claims under New York law, deemed employee fraudulent
inducement claims an uncontroversial application of basic tort and fraud law.93
Stewart held that an employer may be liable for making fraudulent statements of
fact (there, mainly about the client base and practice areas of the new employer, a
law firm94) that induced an employee to give up other job opportunities to enter,

action.” Id. at 648. Finally, the court held that the “defendant falsely told the plaintiff . . . that he
was closing sales ‘right along.’ This is a misrepresentation of an existing fact and is actionable.”
Id. Accordingly, the court found that the allegations of the plaintiffs did “state facts sufficient to
state a cause of action for deceit.” Id.
90
Similarly, an employer’s misrepresentations to an employee may (at least according to one lower
court) be actionable if they occur after the at-will employment ends. The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals so held in Betterman v. Fleming Cos., 677 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), allowing an
employee to sue when his employer lied about his termination, telling him he was not in fact
terminated. Unlike in cases in which the misrepresentations occurred while the at-will employee
was still employed, the plaintiff was no longer employed at the time of the misrepresentations, so
the employer was not protected from fraud liability by the employment-at-will rule. Id. at 679
(“[T]he rule barring intentional misrepresentation claims where there is an at-will contract does not
apply when there is no employment relationship.”).
91
See supra Part II.A.1.
92
976 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1992).
93
Id. at 88-89 (“[U]nder New York law ‘[i]t is elementary that where a contract or transaction was
induced by false representations, the representations and the contract are distinct and separable....
Thus, fraud in the inducement of a written contract is not merged therein so as to preclude an action
for fraud.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
94
Id. at 89 (plaintiff, an environmental lawyer, left her existing job to join the defendant law firm
based on defendant’s “four misrepresentations: (1) ‘[defendant] Jackson had recently secured a
large environmental law client’; (2) ‘Jackson was in the process of establishing an environmental
law department’; (3) ‘Stewart would head the environmental law department’; and (4) ‘[Stewart
would] be expected to service the firm's substantial existing environmental law client.’”)
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and also to remain, in the defendant’s employ.95
Following Stewart, New York courts repeatedly have recognized fraudulent
inducement claims by employees claiming that they either (a) were new
employees defrauded into coming to work for the employer96 or (b) were
incumbent employees defrauded into remaining with the employer.97 The latter
class of employees would have no claim in Wisconsin, purportedly because
employment at will is inconsistent with such a claim. Yet New York does not
95

Id. at 87 (“Upon her arrival, Stewart alleges that Jackson & Nash put her to work primarily on
general litigation matters. When she inquired about the promised environmental work, Herzog
repeatedly assured her that it would be forthcoming and ‘also consistently advised [her] that she
would be promoted to . . . head of Jackson's environmental law department.’”).
96
See, e.g., Gabriel v. Therapists Unlimited, L.P., 218 A.D.2d 614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(inducement to come work for defendant: reversing dismissal of plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement
claim where “[t]he false representation alleged to have been made by defendant was that it had
existing contractual arrangements with health care facilities where plaintiffs could be placed, so as
to satisfy the State license requirements” for plaintiffs to practice speech/language pathology);
Navaretta v. Group Health Inc., 191 A.D.2d 953, 953-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (inducement to
come work for defendant: reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that defendant “represented that
the proposed [written] tests were unimportant when in fact they were crucial to her employment….
Plaintiff claims that Nikles made these false representations and withheld pivotal information for
the purpose of inducing her to terminate her previous employment and work for defendant”).
97
See, e.g., Cole v. Kobs & Draft Advertising, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(inducement to remain in defendant’s employ: “Cole alleges that Kobs made phantom promises of
a promotion and sustained employment as part of a fraudulent scheme to induce her to remain at
Kobs long enough to maneuver a new employee into position”; her at-will status was no barrier
because even though “New York courts routinely reject attempts by employees to circumvent an
employer's termination right merely by alleging claims sounding in tort,” Cole’s claim, like that in
Stewart, “seeks damages related to Kobs's allegedly successful effort at sabotaging her [client]
relationship … and tainting her reputation within the direct market advertising industry, rather than
for any damages caused by the termination decision itself”); Backer v. Lewit, 180 A.D.2d 134
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (inducement to come work for defendant and also to remain in defendant’s
employ: “plaintiff was induced to leave his prior employment and to continue his marketing efforts
in reliance upon the representations that Trendstar was an ongoing business, that the individual
defendants would produce a fall 1989 line, when, in fact, defendants at all times only wanted
plaintiff to liquidate the inventory,” id. at 139; defendant also told plaintiff that if he “develop[ed] a
national sales force for Trendstar his employment would be extended and he would thereby earn
not only a salary but substantial commissions as well,” id. at 136; “Plaintiff alleges that the
assurances made during the first six months of employment were false, that the defendants knew
they were false, that he relied upon those assurances to continue his work as a sales manager of
Trendstar,” id. at 136); Shaitelman v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(inducement to remain in defendant’s employ: allowing plaintiffs’ tort claim despite at-will status,
because “the defendant allegedly breached a duty independent of the contract by making
affirmative misrepresentations to induce plaintiffs' continuing performance and reliance,” i.e.,
defendant “fraudulently induced [plaintiffs] to continue in its employ by knowingly and falsely
representing … [1] that their earnings were unlimited and that they had the unlimited financial
potential of commissioned salesmen although they were employees at will [and] … [2] that they
would receive monies earned and accumulated in the form of surplus credits thereby inducing
plaintiffs to believe that they had a financial incentive to continue in [defendant’s] employ”).
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see any such conflict. For example, in Shaitelman v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co.,
the plaintiff alleged fraudulent inducement to remain in the defendant’s employ
but lost his termination claim because “New York courts continue to adhere to
the principle that employment contracts for an indefinite period of time are
terminable at will.”98 That the parties’ employment “contract” was terminable at
will, however, just meant there was no contract or termination claim; it did not
preclude an “independent” tort claim, because
New York courts have long held that an action for fraudulent
misrepresentation, independently pleaded, can constitute a cause of
action which may be pleaded in addition to, or as an alternative to, an
action for breach of contract. . . . [Defendant] breached a duty
independent of the contract by making affirmative misrepresentations to
induce plaintiffs’ continuing performance and reliance.”99
Another court allowed fraudulent inducement claims by at-will employees for
similar reasons:
[A]s an “at will” employee[,] . . . she is not suing defendant based on a
breach of her employment contract but on a tort claim that defendant’s
agent fraudulently misrepresented facts to induce her into entering into
employment with defendant. Such a cause of action is cognizable if
specific enough and if the plaintiff alleges misstatements of existing fact
as opposed to expressions of future expectation. . . . [The at-will rule]
does not prevent plaintiff from potentially recovering for injuries
resulting from her reliance on defendant’s allegedly false statements.100
Thus, New York rejects Wisconsin’s notion of an irreconcilable conflict
between employment at will and fraudulent inducement claims. As with the
other doctrines discussed, two states asserting a century of fealty to employment
at will have recently been reaching quite contrary conclusions as to exactly what
claims the doctrine allows or forbids.
98

Shaitelman, 517 F. Supp. at 24.
Id. at 22-23.
100
Navaretta, 191 A.D.2d at 954 -55 (citing Stewart, 976 F.2d at 88)) (other citations omitted).
Notably, where a New York court rejects such a claim, it is not on the premise that the claim does
not exist, but instead because the particular plaintiff’s claim happened to be a loser – for example,
when an at-will employee cannot prove “reasonable reliance” on a highly specific term of
employment, such as start date. E.g., Marino v. Oakwood Care Ctr., 774 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (“defendants offered the plaintiff the position of Director of Social Work at a
skilled nursing facility which was still under construction. The plaintiff did not allege that the
parties entered into an agreement which required the defendants to employ her for a definite and
specified term, or which otherwise limited the defendants' right to change the terms of their
employment offer by deferring her proposed starting date. . . . Furthermore, since the plaintiff was
offered only at-will employment, she cannot establish reasonable reliance, a necessary element to
recover damages on theories of fraudulent misrepresentation . . . ”).
99
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3. “Implied Covenant” Claims: Termination Just Before Compensation
Due
Many employees have “deferred compensation” arrangements providing pay
weeks or months after they perform particular work. Salespeople and other
employees often receive part of their remuneration from commissions paid some
time after the sale is made.101 Deferred compensation also is common outside the
sales context; for example, white-collar jobs may feature lump-sum “guaranteed
bonus” payments, or bonuses contingent only on reaching fixed financial targets
(e.g., 10% bonus if X profitability target reached).
Such arrangements leave at-will employees vulnerable to exploitation when
large payments are due them. Employers may be tempted to terminate the
employee about to be due a large guaranteed bonus or an unusually large
commission for a recent sale. Commission plans are contracts, and under basic
contract law, employers can decline to pay terminated employees any not-yet-due
commissions, even on sales already completed, so long as the employer’s
commission plan says that employees will receive their commissions only if they
are still employed on a certain date, such as the date the deferred payment is
due102 or the date the customer pays the funds generating the commission.103
Some jurisdictions apply an “implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing” to “scrutinize discharges . . . when plaintiffs allege that they were fired
to prevent them from receiving compensation for already completed services.”104
This “implied covenant,” however, is a substantial exception to employment at
will; just as employers ordinarily can fire, they ordinarily can cut an employee’s
pay or commission entitlement at any time, for any reason. Strong adherence to
employment at will would leave employees unprotected; if employees want job
security against unfair terminations just before their compensation due date, they
can negotiate appropriate contract terms.105 Indeed, “[a] decided majority of
101
E.g., Tuttle v. Geo. McQuesten Co., 642 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (allowing
plaintiff, after resigning, to recover “hold over monies” – commissions he had earned but that,
under his employment agreement, were vested and due to be paid only at the end of the year or
later).
102
E.g., Dwyer v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(denying employee’s claim for post-termination commissions where her contract “expressly stated
Defendant’s policy ‘not to pay commissions on spots broadcast after the effective date of the
termination of your employment … regardless of when the sale was made’”).
103
E.g., Goldsmith v. J.I. Sopher & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“Plaintiff
… was not entitled to … commissions received by defendant after the date of his termination.
Plaintiff's … agreement provided for payment to plaintiff of a percentage of the gross commissions
generated by sales agents under plaintiff's management and ‘collected’ by defendant. The
commissions in dispute were not ‘collected’ prior to the termination of plaintiff's employment.”).
104
Verkerke, supra note 17, at 844-45.
105
See supra note 6.
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jurisdictions . . . refuse[s] to apply the covenant to employment contracts under
any circumstances . . . . [A] duty of good faith is fundamentally inconsistent with
an employer’s right to discharge at will.”106
One might intuit that states strictly construing employment at will to preclude
common law “public policy” claims would similarly preclude common law
“implied covenant” claims. Conversely, one might suspect that states allowing
public policy claims would be less doctrinaire about employment at will and
therefore would allow implied covenant claims. However, New York and
Wisconsin do exactly the opposite: the state essentially rejecting public policy
claims (New York) is the one often allowing these implied covenant claims,
while the state strongly recognizing public policy claims (Wisconsin) is the one
rejecting implied covenant claims. Worse, the situation is even more incoherent
in New York, where federal and state courts are waging a silent, unacknowledged
war over whether to recognize implied covenant claims.
a. Wisconsin: No Implied Covenant Claims
Wisconsin is part of the majority categorically rejecting any “implied
covenant” claim for employees terminated just before they were due certain
compensation. Wisconsin expressly and repeatedly has rejected Massachusetts’s
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,107 the leading case recognizing this sort
of implied covenant claim,108 even as Wisconsin simultaneously created the
public policy discharge claim.109 Wisconsin courts have continued to reject any
claim110 that “[w]here an employer deprives an agent of his commission by
106

Verkerke, supra note 17, at 845.
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); see Gary Minda, Employment At-Will in the Second Circuit, 52
BROOK. L. REV. 913, 918 (1986) (“Fortune . . . held that a former salesman could bring suit to
recover alleged sales commissions under a terminated at-will employment contract on the ground
that ‘in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing’ which
prevents contract parties from ‘destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the contract.’”).
108
Through 2004, Fortune had been cited in the court decisions of 42 states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and 425 times overall (Westlaw search performed in February 2005,
limited to decisions through 2004).
109
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983). In addition to rejecting
Fortune, Wisconsin courts never have cited Wakefield, perhaps the second leading case establishing
this claim, and the case that first established the claim under New York law.
110
Wisconsin does have a statute allowing employees to sue for unpaid wages, but it covers only
fully earned compensation, so it does not allow an employee to sue for money she was about to
earn (and that the employer terminated her to avoid paying). Tennyson v. School Dist. of
Menomonie Area, 606 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that under Wisconsin wage
protection statute, “the term ‘wages’ does not include unearned salary due and owing to a
discharged employee”). Thus, in Wisconsin, there simply is no claim for an employee in the
Wakefield or Fortune situation.
107
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terminating the contractual relationship, the employer has acted in bad faith.”111
b. New York: Unrecognized Doctrinal Chaos – Implied Covenant
Claims, But Only in Federal Court?
The situation is far muddier in New York. Despite the state’s loyalty to the
strong form of employment at will in other contexts (e.g., rejecting “public
policy” claims), federal courts recognize an “implied covenant” claim for
employees under New York law. The leading, Wakefield v. Northern Telecom,
Inc.,112 recognized a salesman’s claim that he was fired to deprive him of hefty
sales commissions; the Second Circuit conceded that he was employed at-will
but noted that “[w]here, however, a covenant of good faith is necessary to enable
one party to receive the benefits promised for performance, it is implied by law
as necessary to effectuate the intent of the parties.”113 Various federal courts
since have reaffirmed the availability of such claims under New York law.114
111

Lemon v. Fry, 349 N.W.2d 109 (Table), 1984 WL 180467, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct. App. March 27,
1984) (rejecting dissent’s argument that plaintiff stated a claim that defendant, “[w]ithout any basis,
… discharged [plaintiff] and the other two agents who had accumulated a substantial investment in
the renewal commissions earned during their employment,” because (in dissent’s view) “[an]
employment contract contains an implied agreement of good faith and fair dealing so that a
termination not made in good faith but rather in order to prevent the agent from collecting renewal
commissions on policies he had already sold would constitute a breach of contract. See Fortune . . .
Where an employer deprives an agent of his commission by terminating the contractual
relationship, the employer has acted in bad faith. Courts throughout the country have often applied
this rule to prevent overreaching by an employer and the forfeiture by employees of benefits
already earned by the rendering of substantial services.”); see also Andersen v. Mid-Plains Comm.,
394 N.W.2d 316 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb 12, 1986) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 84-2042) (“[A]s in
Fortune, Mid-Plains fired Andersen to avoid paying him commissions. . . . The Fortune court held
that the salesman's employment contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and that a bad
faith discharge constituted a breach of contract. The Brockmeyer court expressly rejected this
position, however, refusing ‘to impose a duty to terminate in good faith into employment contracts’
. . . [i]n addressing the scope of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine”) (citation
omitted).
112
769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985).
113
Id. at 112.
114
See Knudsen v. Quebecor Printing, 792 F. Supp. 234, 238-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (reaffirming
applicability of Wakefield, denying motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s “claim that Defendant violated its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating him in order to avoid paying sales
commissions”); Murphy v. Gabelli, No. 93 Civ. 1539 (LBS), 1994 WL 560982, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 12, 1994) (citing Knudsen, denying defendants summary judgment on claim that they
“improperly terminated [plaintiff’s] employment in order to avoid paying him commissions”); In re
Vasu, 129 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying New York law and denying defendant
motion to dismiss, because “[a]s in Wakefield, a provision in the Letter can be construed to limit
Vasu’s rights to recover earned commissions if Vasu was not employed at the time the
commissions were paid. Construed favorably to Vasu, the complaint can be read to allege that
avoiding payment of Vasu’s earned commissions was a substantial motivating factor in Tremont’s
decision to terminate”); Lawford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 906, 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding that under Wakefield, “plaintiff has made an adequate showing of improper motive
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New York’s statecourts, however, have not recognized this sort of “implied
covenant” claim. Yet, amazingly, neither have they rejected Wakefield or the
other federal cases recognizing such claims under New York law. In Gallagher
v. Lambert,115 the New York Court of Appeals rejected an implied covenant
claim where an employee was fired the day before he would have earned a
windfall due to an increase in his stock buyback price; in the roughly
contemporaneous Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.,116 the same court rejected a
very similar claim. Gallagher’s rejection of implied covenant claims came after
Wakefield, but it neither rejected nor distinguished Wakefield; it simply did not
mention it (and neither did Ingle).
These decisions by the state’s high court would seem dispositive, but the
federal courts since Gallagher and Ingle have continued to accept such claims,
protecting Wakefield by asserting that “[a]lthough Gallagher can be read as a
rejection of Wakefield, such a reading is not necessary. . . . Wakefield was
ignored by the [Gallagher] majority. . . . Gallagher does not disturb the
authority of Wakefield, at least in the context of employment sales commission
provisions.”117 Only one federal case, Collins & Aikman Floor Coverings Corp.
to allow his claim of wrongful termination to avoid commissions”); Metzler v. Harris Corp., No. 00
Civ. 5847 (HB), 2001 WL 194911, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2001) (“While the New York Court of
Appeals held that ‘this state neither recognizes a tort of wrongful discharge nor requires good faith
in an at-will employment relationship[,]’ the Second Circuit's decision in Wakefield clouds that
holding so that, at this stage of the litigation, the motion to dismiss must be denied” (citation
omitted)); Mirabella v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 21146657, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,
2003) (citing Wakefield and Knudsen for rule that “an at-will employee could recover under a
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory if the employee could demonstrate that his
employment was terminated so that the employer could avoid paying him earned commissions on
completed sales,” but rejecting plaintiff’s claim on the facts because “[the] performance incentives
for which plaintiff was eligible were entirely discretionary. . . . Consequently, no fixed amount
could have been due to the plaintiff at the time of his termination, and thus the defendant remained
free to terminate plaintiff at-will”).
115
549 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1989).
116
73 N.Y.2d 183 (N.Y. 1989) (rejecting claim where defendant fired at-will employee for purpose
of triggering stock buyback agreement, even where it did this for purpose of denying employeeshareholder a right to benefit from impending transaction).
117
Knudsen v. Quebecor Printing (U.S.A.) Inc., 792 F. Supp. 234, 238-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“Gallagher is distinguishable[,] . . . involv[ing] a buy-back provision for employee stock, whereas
Wakefield . . . involve[d] sales commissions due and owing to employees. A sales commission
provision provides for an employer to pay its employees commissions earned through the
employees' own efforts. In contrast, a stock buy-back provision affords employees a form of
compensation that is related merely to the employees' length of tenure rather than to the extent of
their efforts. The Second Circuit's finding of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
while compelling in the sales commissions context, is less so in the stock buy-back context because
buy-back provisions do not relate as directly to the efforts of employees as do sales commission
provisions.”); see also Lawford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 906, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(allowing Wakefield claim, interpreting Ingle as holding only that “plaintiff may not recover for his
termination per se” because “[t]he only time an employee may maintain a wrongful termination
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v. Froehlich,118 cites Gallagher as an abrogation of Wakefield.119
The state courts’ response to this conflict in authority has been quiet and
murky. No state court cases follow the federal authority to allow implied
covenant claims.120 Some state cases interpret Gallagher and Ingle broadly, as
precluding any implied covenant claims, but none address the specific claim the
federal cases recognize: that employers cannot terminate at-will employees to
avoid paying impending earned commissions or other deferred compensation.121
Despite the dissonance between the state and federal authority, no state court
decisions have addressed this state-federal tension, and neither have any law
reviews. No state cases have responded to Knudsen’s aggressive defense of
Wakefield and distinguishing of Gallagher; neither have any state courts
responded to Collins, the federal decision viewing Wakefield as abrogated. Only
one state court case even has cited Wakefield and either Gallagher or Ingle:
Naylor v. CEAG Elec. Corp.,122 which rejected plaintiff’s claim “alleging a
breach of an implied duty of good faith on defendant’s part by terminating
plaintiff in an attempt to avoid the payment of commissions justly owing to
him.”123 Despite asserting that under Ingle, “there is no implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing” for at-will employees, Naylor did not categorically
reject Wakefield, instead distinguishing it based on that employee’s stronger
contractual argument for his commissions.124
In sum, Wisconsin clearly rejects any implied covenant claim, whereas in
New York there is no clear rule: employees’ rights under state law depend on
claim is when the employee has an oral or written contract for a definite term”).
118
736 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
119
Id. at 485-86.
120
No state court cases cite any of the federal cases, see supra note 114, as to whether an implied
covenant claim is available under New York law.
121
See Parker v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding, without
recounting any of the facts relied upon, that “defendant could terminate plaintiff at any time for any
reason or no reason, i.e., plaintiff has no cause of action for breach of contract, breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” citing Ingle and Murphy); Naylor v. CEAG Elec. Corp.,
551 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (distinguishing Wakefield as involving a clearer
contractual right to commissions, but also reading Ingle and Murphy broadly: “The Court of
Appeals has continuously held that when an employment is at-will, there is no implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing. Because the employer has the unfettered right to terminate an at-will
employee at any time, an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent.”).
No other state court case cites either Gallagher or Ingle as to the availability of an implied
covenant claim of the sort recognized in Wakefield.
122
551 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
123
Id. at 351-52.
124
Id. at 352 (stating that inWakefield , “the commissions contract created rights distinct from the
employment relationship”).
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whether they meet the jurisdictional prerequisites to sue in federal court.125 In
other words, New York law is not only inconsistent with that of other states, but
so incoherent within the state that substantive employment rights depend entirely
on unrelated jurisdictional doctrine about which court can hear the case.
B. Summary: Courts Alternately Citing and Ignoring “Employment at
Will” Whenever Convenient to Reject or Accept Claims
As discussed above, both Wisconsin and New York entirely reject certain
common law employee claims on the theory that employer liability to employees
would violate the employment-at-will rule. Yet each state recognizes some
employee claims despite employment at will and, bewilderingly, each state seems
to accept and reject almost the exact opposite set of claims as the other state:
Common Law Claim

Wisconsin

New York

Termination in Violation of
Public Policy

Yes

No, except in extremely
narrow circumstances126

“Fraudulent Inducement” to
No for employees
Work for Employer
Yes for job candidates
Breach of Implied Covenant
(fired just before pay due)

No

Yes
? (recognized in federal
court, not in state court)

This sort of dissonance is typical among the states.127 With each state asserting
adherence to employment at will as its reason for adopting and rejecting opposite
claims (all of which infringe on employers’ broad at-will prerogative to set
employment conditions and fire), “employment at will” is an insufficient
explanation for what employment claims can exist, and for that reason it cannot
be all that drives courts’ decisions.
Is there a principled explanation for this apparent interstate inconsistency?
Two possible explanations merit discussion: can the apparent discrepancy be
explained by either (1) states’ reliance on statutory rather than common law
125
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing for federal court “diversity jurisdiction” over state claims where the
parties are from different states and at least $75,000 is in controversy).
126
No claim exists other than (a) the extremely narrow and ineffectual statutory “whistleblower”
claim and (b) the extremely narrow and almost never applied claim for attorneys claiming
retaliation for their compliance with ethical rules. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
127
E.g., Virginia parallels Wisconsin, recognizing public policy discharge claims, see Lawrence
Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808-09 (Va. 1996) (“Even though we strongly
adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, there are narrow exceptions,” including public policy
claims covering discharges contravening even a statute not expressly providing a right to sue.)
(citation omitted), while rejecting implied covenant of good faith claims by terminated salespersons
denied commissions, see Derthick v. Bassett-Walker, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510, 522 (W.D. Va. 1995)
(“Virginia does not recognize . . . claim[s] for breach of this implied covenant.”).
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protections (2) the inherent inter-state variability of common law doctrine?
1. Statutes as Substitutes for Rejected Common Law Doctrines?
The above discussion focused principally on common law doctrines; are
there state statutes filling in the apparent gaps in their common law? If so, there
would be no inconsistency as to substantive law, just differing use of statutes
versus common law to create employment rights. A quick examination of New
York’s and Wisconsin’s employment statues shows that in neither state do
statutory rights play nearly enough of a meaningful role to explain the gaps and
inconsistencies in the common law doctrine:
• Public Policy Claims: New York’s rejection of such claims cannot be
based on the alternative of statutory protection. New York rejected
any common law public policy claim in 1983, when there was no
meaningful statute providing such protection;128 in 1984 the legislature
enacted the notoriously useless Labor Law § 740;129 and the state
courts have stood by their 1983 decision ever since.
• Implied Covenant Claims: Both New York and Wisconsin have
similar wage statutes essentially codifying contract claims to earned
commissions; neither statute protects the right not to be deprived of
commissions via an at-will termination.130
• Fraudulent Inducement Claims: Neither state has a relevant statute.
New York accepts such claims purely as a matter of tort common law;
Wisconsin rejects employee claims while accepting job candidates’
pre-employment claims, also purely under tort common law.
Thus, neither state substantially relies on statutes relevant to the common law
claims discussed above, and neither state has applicable statutes very different
from the other’s. Reliance on statutes, though a theoretical explanation for
rejecting a common law doctrine, simply does not explain the common law
incoherence discussed above.
2. Interstate Variation: Inherent to Common Law?
Is this sort of inconsistency simply inherent to common law doctrine? After
all, part of the job of a judge, especially on a state high court, is to make
judgments about how to balance competing legal principles, such as employment
at will and other public policies; judges in different states just may happen to
reach different conclusions about how to balance those competing principles.
128

See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.).
See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing Labor Law § 740).
130
See supra note 110 (recounting the limitations of Wisconsin’s wage statute). Accord N.Y. Lab.
L. Art. 6 (providing similarly circumscribed statutory protection).
129
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Perhaps, but the lack of candor about employment at will remains: courts should
not pretend that employment at will ties their hands, allowing them to recognize
certain new claims but binding them from recognizing certain others that
similarly infringe on the employment-at-will rule.
Moreover, it is significant that, over the past two decades, courts (a) have
recognized numerous legal claims that substantially infringe on the employer’s
long-established employment-at-will prerogatives, (b) have been unable to agree
on which claims an employment-at-will regime can permit, and (c) have refused
to acknowledge that they are weakening the established employment-at-will
doctrine. This phenomenon – increasing exceptions, inconsistency as to which
exceptions, and refusal to acknowledge the weakening of old doctrine – is not
unique to employment law. It arises partly from the very nature of common law
judicial decisionmaking, as frequently illustrated by another, more prominent
area of “common law” decisionmaking: constitutional law.131
III. SIMILAR DOCTRINAL INCOHERENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: WHEN
COURTS NEITHER FOLLOW NOR REJECT ESTABLISHED RULES
There are striking parallels between recent developments in employment at
will and two fields of constitutional law: abortion rights and the prohibition on
laws “respecting an establishment of religion” (the “Establishment Clause”).
These fields have experienced developments similar to the increasing
incoherence of employment at will, so examining them can help illuminate what
is happening to employment at will. In both abortion and Establishment Clause
doctrine, a decades-old precedent established a strict rule: a fundamental right to
abortion under Roe v. Wade;132 a strict separation of church and state under
Lemon v. Kurtzman.133 While constitutional doctrines never are 100% bright-line
rules, these two were quite categorical. They eschewed the ad hoc and balancing
tests then common in constitutional law,134 instead imposing wide-ranging
131

Constitutional law is not literally “common law,” of course, but constitutional and common-law
interpretation share a critical feature: an entire body of modern law has derived from a series of
cases, spanning decades or centuries, interpreting broad principles like “employment at will” or
“make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” See David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 885 (1996) (“Our written constitution has, by
now, become part of an evolutionary common law system, and the common law – rather than any
model based on the interpretation of codified law – provides the best way to understand the
practices of American constitutional law.”). But see Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism,
Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 980-982 (2004) (recounting criticism of Strauss for dismissing
the effects of constitutional text on the cultural evolution that guides common law development).
132
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
134
E.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that social security disability benefits
recipient had no right to hearing before (as opposed to after) benefits termination; declaring that
three-factor balancing test determines Due Process rights to procedural safeguards: (1) private
interest at stake; (2) public interest affected by the procedures sought; and (3) risk of erroneous
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restrictions based on broad interpretations of “at best opaque” doctrines.135
Recently, however, the Court has whittled away at both Roe and Lemon,
allowing abortion restrictions and government involvement in religion that
clearly would not have passed muster under Roe and Lemon as originally
formulated. Yet to the surprise of many, the Court expressly has declined to
overturn Roe and Lemon, even as it repeatedly limited both. This dissonance has
left these constitutional doctrines incoherent, with a strict precedent still on the
books but ignored whenever the Court sees fit to allow something the precedent
would disallow – a phenomenon quite similar to the status of employment at will.
Ultimately, in these two areas, the Court has shifted from a strict “rule” to a
context-specific “standard.”136 The new standard lacks clarity, however, and not
just because standards tend to be less clear than rules.137 Because of the Court’s
refusal to acknowledge the rule’s decline, the new standard is of necessity a
vague, confusing attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable: (a) the broad principles
of the old rule, and (b) the new cases inconsistent with the rule. The Court’s lack
of forthrightness about its jurisprudence has negatively impacted the coherence
of the emerging doctrine – a cautionary tale for courts not acknowledging the
weakening of any established doctrine, like employment at will.
A. Abortion: The Limbo Status of Roe, as “Fundamental Right” Gives Way
to “Undue Burden”

deprivation, considering the value of possible safeguards). “The difficulty of predicting how the
Supreme Court will employ the Matthews balancing test,” Jason T. Jacoby, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.:
“Equal Justice” for Indigent Parents, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 571, 581 n.58 (1998), has been noted
widely. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 139, 215 n.249 (2000) (noting “criticism of the Matthews test as permitting total
flexibility in result”).
135
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (describing First Amendment’s religion clauses as “at best opaque,
particularly when compared with other portions” of the Constitution).
136
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
Sullivan observes that “the Court showed surprising moderation” in early 1990s constitutional law,
including in the abortion case Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Establishment case Lee v.
Weisman. Id. at 24-25 (discussed infra). She argues this moderation reflected the Justices’
split over the choice of rules or standards – over whether to cast legal directives in more
or less discretionary form. Similar divisions have split the Court before[;] . . . Justice
Black favored absolute rules, Justice Frankfurter favored more flexible balancing. In that
round of the debate, rules were allied with liberal positions and standards with
conservative ones. In this round, the political valences were the opposite. . . . [T]he
Justices of standards braked the rightward thrust of the Justices of rules.
Id. at 26. “When Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter proved to be Justices of standards, they
slowed the Court's predicted veer to the political right. . . . Ideological poles tend to attract rules.
Standards tend to dive for the middle and split the difference between ideological pole.” Id. at 122.
137
Id.
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Roe v. Wade,138 the first Supreme Court case recognizing a constitutional
right to abortion, deemed the recently established right to privacy139 “broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”140 Roe did not lay out minimalist protection for this unenumerated
right; it declared abortion a “fundamental right” protected against infringement
with “strict scrutiny.”141 More unexpectedly, unlike most constitutional
decisions, Roe did not just invalidate the law at issue; it fleshed out the new right
with an unusually specific, broad ruling going well beyond the case facts.
(1) In the first trimester, the abortion right is categorical and cannot be
infringed.142
(2) As of the second trimester, the government has very limited ability to
regulate: only to protect “the health of the mother” by “regulat[ing]
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health,”143 such as with licensing and qualification
requirements for abortion providers.144
(3) Only once “the fetus becomes ‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live
outside the mother’s womb, . . . [which is] usually placed at about
seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24
weeks,”145 does government’s interest in “potential[]” . . . life”
become “compelling” enough to override the mother’s rights,
allowing government to “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except . . . [as] necessary [for] . . . the life or health of the mother.”146
Given the many subtleties of such a complex issue (e.g., the many different
reasons to have an abortion; the difference between pre- and post-viability
abortions), Roe’s rules were about as categorical and bright-line as they could be.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent noted that infringements of “liberties” not enumerated
in the Constitution typically draw only deferential “rational basis” scrutiny.147
138

410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas ban on all abortions unless necessary for mother’s life).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down an anti-contraception statute,
in holding that married couples enjoy a “relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
140
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
141
Id. at 155 (holding that “regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling
state interest,’ and the legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake”).
142
Id. at 164.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 163.
145
Id. at 160.
146
Id. at 165 (in summary at end of Blackmun opinion).
147
Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139
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He also criticized as improper judicial legislation “[t]he decision here to break
pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the
state may impose in each one.”148 But even Roe’s supporters were struck by the
breadth of the new right and its far-reaching impact.149
Although seven Justices comprised the Roe majority,150 by the late 1980s,
three new Justices151 had joined the Roe dissenters to limit and possibly overturn
Roe. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,152 the Court upheld a Missouri
ban on abortions after twenty weeks absent a medical test verifying that the fetus
was not viable.153 A three-Justice plurality154 criticized “the rigid Roe
framework”; Justice Scalia called for Roe to be “overrul[ed] . . . explicitly”;155
and Justice O’Connor more cryptically wrote that in a future case, “there will be
enough time to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully.”156 Dissenting, the three
remaining Roe majority Justices criticized Webster for “discard[ing] a landmark
case”;157 more dispassionate observers noted that Webster “was the first [case] to
abandon Roe’s trimester framework, which had been reaffirmed [three years
earlier,]. . . . [and] to hold that the state’s interest is compelling even before
viability – again, a direct rejection of Roe.”158 There was “little doubt that
Webster was a significant departure from Roe,” yet most of the Justices issuing
this “direct rejection of Roe . . . expressly declined to overrule Roe,” leaving Roe
in constitutional limbo, with the Court poised to “‘modify and narrow Roe.’”159
148

Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
E.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (“[I]n Roe[,] . . . when the Court had its most dramatic opportunity to
express its supposed aversion to substantive due process, it carried that doctrine to lengths few
observers had expected, imposing limits on permissible abortion legislation so severe that no
abortion law in the United States remained valid.”).
150
Only Justices Rehnquist and White dissented.
151
President Reagan appointed Justice O’Connor in 1981, Justice Scalia in 1986 (while
simultaneously elevating Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice), and Justice Kennedy in 1987.
152
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
153
Id. at 501 (noting that Missouri’s law also declared that life begins at conception and prohibited
use of government funds or facilities for abortions (or “encouraging or counseling” about
abortion)).
154
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by Justice White (the sole other dissenter in Roe)
and Justice Kennedy.
155
492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
156
Id. at 526 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
157
Id. at 560 (“[T]he plurality discards a landmark case of the last generation. . . . For today, the
women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and
very ominous, and a chill wind blows.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and
Marshall).
158
David C. Blickenstaff, Defining the Boundaries of Personal Privacy: Is there a Paternal Interest
in Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1165 (1994).
159
Blickenstaff, supra note 158, at 1165 (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (Rehnquist, J., plurality
149
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey160 only increased the dissonance created by the
Court’s refusal to admit that it had eviscerated Roe. Casey largely upheld
Pennsylvania’s abortion restrictions: (a) upholding a mandatory 24-hour waiting
period following detailed “informed consent” disclosures to women seeking
abortions;161 (b) upholding parental consent requirements for minors;162 and (c)
striking spousal notice requirements for married women.163 To reach this
outcome, Casey lessened the status of the abortion right. No longer were
abortion restrictions presumptively invalid under strict scrutiny for fundamental
rights. Rather, even pre-viability restrictions were presumptively valid, unless
they “impose[] an undue burden” on the choice to have an abortion.164
Yet the Casey plurality remarkably asserted that it was not reversing Roe,
even while expressly “rejecting the trimester framework,” criticizing its
“unnecessary . . . rigidity,”165 and upholding pre-viability abortion restrictions
thatRoe clearly would have forbid.166 Instead, the plurality asserted that “the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.”167 But it defined that “essential holding” narrowly: “a State may not
opinion)).
160
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
161
Id. at 881-87 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter), overruling Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
162
The parental notice requirement posed no “undue burden” in part because the statute allowed for
a “judicial bypass,” in which a judge could waive the requirement in certain specified
circumstances. 505 U.S. at 899-900 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter).
163
The plurality deemed the spousal notification requirement an “undue burden” because of the
possibility that it would force notification of husbands who are abusive and/or might coerce the
woman not to have an abortion. Id. at 887-98 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter).
164
Id. at 874 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter); see Kathryn Kolbert and
David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in
State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1993):
Despite the strong language in Casey, the Court actually backed away from affording
women the highest level of constitutional protection for the abortion choice…. Casey
rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review mandated by Roe, adopting instead a more
permissive ‘undue burden’ standard…. [T]he right to choose abortion is no longer a
fundamental right and thus, women seeking abortions are no longer entitled to the strong
protections afforded other fundamental rights, such as the right to free speech and the
right to vote.
Id. at 1154.
165
505 U.S. at 872-873 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter).
166
See Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1980
(2002) (“[Casey’s] reinterpretation of Roe led the plurality Justices to uphold provisions of the
Pennsylvania statute that would have been unconstitutional under prior law.”).
167
505 U.S. at 845-46 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter).
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prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
pregnancy before viability.”168
There is clear tension between what the plurality did and what it said it did.
The plurality avoided saying that it was reversing Roe by insisting that it had
“retained and . . . reaffirmed” its “central” or “essential” holding, but only by
defining that holding far downward. Abortion morphed from fundamental right
to limited right government can abridge with anything short of a functional ban169
– an “undue burden,” the only major example of which was spousal consent,
which the Court rejected because it risked physical coercion of women.170
Casey would have been more intellectually honest had the Court admitted it
really overruled Roe and replaced “fundamental right”/”strict scrutiny” protection
with a more deferential standard allowing many abortion restrictions. Though
announced with fanfare, the survival of Roe was more spin than substance, as
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent colorfully argued:
[The plurality] retains the outer shell of Roe v. Wade, but beats a
wholesale retreat from the substance . . . .171 While purporting to adhere
to precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist,
but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere
façade to give the illusion of reality. Decisions following Roe . . . are
frankly overruled in part under the ‘undue burden’ standard expounded
in the joint opinion. . . . 172 [Roe] stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin
Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a monument to the
importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the façade, an entirely
new method of analysis . . . decide[s] . . . state [abortion] laws.173
While it is predictable for a dissent to criticize the plurality, commentators across

168

Id. at 879 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter) (emphasis added).
“[Casey] protects women only against total prohibitions on their right to choose to have a safe
abortion.” Whitman, supra note 166, at 1981. The decision is “a compromise that will protect
women only from the most overwhelming and total coercion.” Id. at 1985. “What Casey gives a
woman is simply ‘some freedom to terminate her pregnancy’ if she does so before the fetus
becomes viable.” Id. at 1988.
170
505 U.S. at 893-94 (plurality joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter) (noting that the
“millions of women . . . who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at the
hands of their husbands . . . may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands
of their decision to obtain an abortion,” and with a spousal notification requirement, those women
“are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion”).
171
Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172
Id. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
173
Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169
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the ideological spectrum essentially agreed as to the undignified fate of Roe.174
Furthering the confusion, the post-Casey Court has remained splintered; even
the three Casey plurality co-authors split three different ways as to what their
joint opinion meant. In the Court’s next abortion case, Stenberg v. Carhart,175
Justice Kennedy parted ways with his co-authors, Justices O’Connor and Souter,
to pen a dissent joined by the remaining Casey dissenters.176 Justices O’Connor
and Souter joined the Sternberg majority striking down Nebraska’s ban on a
controversial mid-to-late-term abortion procedure;177 under Casey, the law
imposed an “undue burden” on abortion because it (a) lacked an exception
allowing the procedure to preserve the woman’s health and (b) had ambiguous
wording that could be construed as banning other, earlier-term abortions.178 In
unusually strident tones, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s
misunderstanding [of] the record, misinterpretation of Casey, outright
refusal to respect the law of a State, and statutory construction in conflict
with settled rules. . . . [T]he people of Nebraska were forthright in
confronting an issue of immense moral consequence[,] . . . a procedure
many decent and civilized people find so abhorrent as to be among the
most serious of crimes against human life. . . . The Court closes its eyes
to these profound concerns.179
It is almost surreal that one of the three Casey plurality authors accused his
co-authors of a “basic misunderstanding of Casey.”180 But the disagreement
174

See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 41 & n.44
(2000) (viewing Casey, in a dispassionate rather than ideological analysis, as an example of the
Court “admitting error” only in a “grudging and indirect” way, “quietly overruled various lesserknown cases while loudly pledging allegiance to precedent in general and the more prominent case
of Roe in particular”); Whitman, supra note 166 (“Casey can also be viewed as a significant
betrayal of the hopes raised by Roe,” id. at 1986; “Although the expected deathblow to Roe v. Wade
was not delivered, when the plurality concludes its discussion of the Pennsylvania statute, it is
apparent that only a sliver remains,” id. at 1988); Blickenstaff, supra note 158 (“Women’s
reproductive rights have eroded significantly since Roe,” id. at 1162, and “Casey . . . represents the
emergence of a new approach to abortion jurisprudence … [in which] woman no longer enjoy the
kind of rights the Court recognized in Roe,” id. at 1166); Kolbert & Gans, supra note 164.
175
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
176
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas (all Casey dissenters) joined Justice
Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent; Justice White retired after Casey, replaced by Justice Ginsburg.
177
The statute targeted primarily a procedure known as “dilation and extraction” (“D&X”) in
medical terms, or “partial birth abortion” in the terminology of legislation banning the procedure –
a procedure controversial because it is used primarily after the sixteenth week of pregnancy, see
530 U.S. at 927-28, and because many view the procedure as bearing a “resemblance to
infanticide,” id. at 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178
The other abortion procedure at issue was the “dilation and evacuation” (“D&E”), which is
common in weeks 12 to 24. Id. at 924.
179
Id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180
Id. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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among the three did not even end there. Parting ways with Justice Souter, Justice
O’Connor concurred separately to explain that other states’ similar statutes would
pass constitutional muster under her interpretation of Casey: [U]nlike Nebraska,
some other States have enacted statutes more narrowly tailored. . . . [O]nly
proscrib[ing] the D&X method . . . [with] an exception to preserve the life and
health of the mother would be constitutional in my view.181 Thus, the three
Casey co-authors wrote a new standard and promptly illustrated its hopeless
vagueness by splitting three different ways on how to apply it. “Realistically,
this does not end with [Stenberg v.] Carhart,” because the Court issued “a split
decision,”182 as the mixed bag of post-Stenberg lower-court decisions shows.183
In sum, a majority of Justices clearly had become uncomfortable adhering to
Roe, but also uncomfortable overruling it. The result? An “undue burden”
standard whose vagueness is its only virtue: it can claim consistency with Roe
but allow abortion restrictions Roe never would have allowed. This simultaneous
upholding and gutting of Roe is more chaos than compromise, leaving the law so
unsettled that even the three authors of the undue burden test split three ways as
to what it means. When co-authors differ so starkly as to what they meant, there
is little hope for lower courts or legislatures to glean a definitive meaning.
B. Establishment Clause: No Consensus Rule after the Unacknowledged
Death of Lemon
Under the Establishment Clause, a spectrum of views exists as to how much
government can support or participate in religious activity and expression. The
“separation” view advocates for the proverbial “wall of separation between
church and state,” with no religious activity in the public sector and government
barred from providing religious entities any but the most basic, universally
available public benefits. The “accommodation” view, in contrast, allows
religious expression in the public sphere and public benefits for religious entities,
reasoning that the constitution bars only establishing an official state religion or
coercing religious activity. In the middle is the “neutrality” position, a more
context-specific view that government can allow and support religious activities,
181

Id. at 950-51 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Robert E. Barry, Partial Birth Abortion and the Powers of the State, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 197,
247 (2000).
183
See, e.g., Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000)
(striking down a law “indistinguishable from the Nebraska statute at issue in Sternberg”);
WomanCare of Southfield, P.C. v. Granholm, 143 F. Supp. 2d 849 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (striking
down law that included an exception allowing “partial-birth” abortions to preserve the life of the
pregnant woman, but not her mental and/or physical health); Women's Medical Professional Corp.
v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), rehearing & suggestion for rehearing en banc denied (Apr. 1,
2004) (upholding, in 2-1 panel decision, a “partial birth abortion” law meeting Justice O’Connor’s
criteria).
182
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as long as it does so on the same terms as for similar non-religious activities.184
From 1947185 to 1980, the Supreme Court adhered most closely to the
separation view, barring governmental religious expression (e.g., even voluntary
prayer in schools186) and financial support for even partially religious activities
(e.g., state aid to religious schools for secular subjects187).188 Lemon v. Kurtzman
codified the Court’s strict “test” during this era,189 holding that for a government
activity to survive judicial scrutiny, the government must prove the following:
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”190
Starting in the 1980s, however, the Court began allowing more public
religious activity, including some religious holiday displays on public
property,191 more public funds for parochial schools,192 and increased religious
group access to public facilities.193 Yet the Court has not trod all that far towards
the “accommodationist” view, splitting the difference as to which holiday
displays are permissible194 and continuing to forbid prayers195 in even peripheral
184

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1266-1270 (Aspen Publishers 2001)
(discussing the three theories).
185
The earliest modern Establishment Clause case was Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
186
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
187
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
188
See generally Ira C. Lupo, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230
(1993).
189
Lemon expressly stated that it was not creating a new test, but rather was codifying a test based
on its “consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three
such tests may be gleaned from our cases . . . . ” Id. at 612.
190
Id. at 612.
191
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 491 U.S.
573 (1989).
192
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (allowing government to provide tuition
vouchers that students’ parents can use to pay their parochial school tuition); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (allowing lending of public school equipment to parochial schools); Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to be sent to parochial schools to
provide remedial education; expressly overruling the contrary holding of Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985)).
193
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (allowing church
to use public school after hours for religious film, because school was open to other social and civic
groups); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding similarly for
evangelical Christian group seeking to engage in prayer event at public school). This line of case
law began with the Court’s holding in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), that a state
university could not restrict facility use to only non-religious student groups.
194
Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (allowing a treeplus-menorah display but disallowing a crèche).
195
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (banning mere “moments of silence” intended to
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school settings, like graduations196 and football games.197 This hodgepodge of
dos and don’ts made clear that, “contrary to the Supreme Court’s announcement
of a categorical test for the establishment clause, the jurisprudence . . . actually
involves a balancing of interests,”198 and observers advocated “a more candid
acknowledgment of the establishment clause balancing process and a more
consistent treatment of the factors that enter into it.”199
The clear shift in case outcomes, however, has not been accompanied by a
clear shift in doctrinal analysis. Since the 1980s, the Court has been upholding
and rejecting government actions not under the Lemon test, but under different
tests. Sometimes the Court looks to whether government action “constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion” (Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement
test”);200 other times, the Court allows government action unless it would “coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so’” (the
“coercion” test).201 As early as 1989, “it became clear that Lemon was destined
for the constitutional graveyard, though it was unclear what would replace it.”202
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court never has overruled or expressly rejected
Lemon. As when it declined to overturn Roe while substantially changing
abortion doctrine, the Court, even when applying a test as different from Lemon
as “coercion,” flatly stated that it would “not accept the invitation . . . to
reconsider . . . Lemon.”203 Since declining that “invitation,” however, the Court
has veered from virtually ignoring Lemon in deciding an Establishment Clause
case204 to admitting that it has “modified Lemon” but only slightly and only in the
context of parochial school aid.205 This state of affairs has led Justice Scalia to
facilitate “meditation or voluntary prayer”)
196
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer led by clergy).
197
Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2286 (2000) (prayer led by student).
198
Developments in the Law – Religion and State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1987).
199
Id.
200
E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
201
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). Four Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) apply this test.
202
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 813 (1993).
203
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
204
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (citing Lemon only twice as
a “see also” and twice more merely in recounting lower court citations to Lemon in this case).
205
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (“[I]n Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of
evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors. . . . [We] recast Lemon’s
entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect,” the second
Lemon factor, id. at 808); but see David S. Petron, Finding Direction in Indirection: The
Direct/Indirect Aid Distinction in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1233, 1245 (2000) (“Agostini brought a more thorough overhaul of the Lemon test than . . . [the
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depict with a bizarre metaphor how, even though six Justices had criticized
Lemon, the Court has “conspicuously avoided using the supposed ‘test’ but also
declined the invitation to repudiate it”:206
As to the Court’s invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a
late- night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again. . . . Its most recent
burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: . . . [Lee]
conspicuously avoided using the supposed “test” but also declined the
invitation to repudiate it. . . .
The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill.
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we
can command it to return to the tomb at will. . . . When we wish to strike
down a practice it forbids, we invoke it . . . ; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely . . . . Sometimes, we take a
middle course, calling its three prongs “no more than helpful signposts” .
. . . Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in
a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.207
Less colorfully, the Court’s refusal to reject Lemon outright has damaged the
coherence of its case law. With Lemon still “good law” but clearly not guiding
the Court, Justices have been unable to rule based on a single, established test.
The problem is not just the choice of inherently fluid standards over rigid rules,208
and not just the Court’s use of multi-factor analysis in Establishment Clause
cases.209 The main problem is that the post-Lemon case laws chaos has left a
legacy of confusion and prevented any but the most vague “tests” from emerging.
Lemon is difficult to harmonize with the more recent case law; thus, it makes
Court] indicated . . . ”).
206
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
207
Id. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring). Numerous scholars have agreed with Justice Scalia. See, e.g.,
Paulsen, supra note 202, at 882 (“The Lemon test is dead and gone. It has not been applied by the
Court as the test of constitutionality in any of the last four major Establishment Clause cases and
Weisman reveals that the test has few, if any, supporters remaining on the Court . . . [regardless of]
the fact that the Weisman Court did not use the words ‘overrule’ and ‘Lemon’ in the same
sentence.”); David S. Petron, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid Distinction
in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233 (2000) (“[T]he Court has
refused to overrule Lemon and sign its death certificate[, e]ven in Agostini” in 1997).
208
See supra notes 136-137.
209
Cf. Developments in the Law – Religion and State, supra note 198, at 1678 (observing “that
despite the Court’s reaffirmation of the Lemon framework, many of the Court’s decisions . . . can
best be understood as reflecting a number of competing factors that cannot be analyzed consistently
within the confines of the Lemon test. . . . Lemon in fact masks a balancing of interests”).
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sense that Justices have had to resort to vague, least-common-denominator
principles, such as searching for “endorsement” of religion, an ad hoc inquiry in
which each case depends on “unique circumstances.”210 Echoing Justice
Stewart’s infamously vague definition of obscenity (“I know it when I see it”),
Scott Ward has noted that the Court’s Establishment Clause cases “struck many
observers as inconsistent and unprincipled. . . . [T]he Court’s actual approach to
an establishment clause violation is . . . ‘we know it when we see it.’”211
Additionally, the Court has fractured badly: “In all the years of its effort, the
Court has isolated no single test of constitutional sufficiency.”212 Even
“endorsement,” the one post-Lemon test drawing some support from a majority
of Justices, does not have one formulation supported by a majority. The vague
term “endorsement” begs many questions, and one has particularly split the
Court: from whose perspective should “endorsement” be assessed? Justice
O’Connor and two others focus on whether “endorsement” of religion would be
perceived by “a hypothetical observer . . . possess[ing] a certain level of
information that all citizens might not share . . . [and] aware of the history . . . of
the community[,] . . . how the public space in question has been used in the
past.213 This formulation considers endorsement perceptions without accounting
for individuals with lesser knowledge or minority groups with greater sensitivity.
In contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg apply a “reasonable person passing
by” standard: would someone with incomplete information perceive
endorsement? They criticize Justice O’Connor’s formulation, in which the
“‘reasonable person’ comes off as a well-schooled jurist” who fails to perceive
endorsement only because of his extensive legal and historical knowledge.214
There is a similar split among the four Justices advocating a “coercion” test.215
Thus, two decades after Lemon started to lose support, the Court has not
rejected Lemon, and no alternative test commands a majority. Lemon clearly no
longer governs, but because of the Court’s failure to reject it outright, the
emergent alternatives, endorsement and coercion, are vague and conclusory; they
210
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Scott J. Ward, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions,
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had to be, in order to be consistent with both the newer cases and Lemon. In
short, the vagueness required by the Court’s refusal to repudiate Lemon has left
its Establishment Clause jurisprudence muddled and unsettled.
C. Summary: Doctrine Evolution, from Rule to Increasing Incoherence to
Adoption of Vague Standard
The recent history of these two fields of constitutional law can be
summarized as occurring in three stages.
(1) Increasing Exceptions and Limitations to a Strict Rule, But No
Acknowledgment of the Rule’s Decline: It is a recurring
phenomenon, in various fields of law: courts increasingly recognize
exceptions and limitations to an established strict rule, but they do
not acknowledge the decline of that rule. This inconsistency signals
judicial discomfort: courts no longer are comfortable with the
strictures of the rule, yet they are not ready to reject it.
(2) Refusing Invitations to Jettison the Rule: As exceptions and
limitations proliferate, courts are invited to jettison the strict rule as
outdated. Yet courts may surprise many by refusing to do so, instead
reasserting the rule, often in a reality-denying, categorical manner
that ignores how greatly recent decisions have weakened the rule.
The doctrinal chaos may remain for a long time, until courts finally
develop a satisfactory alternative doctrine.
(3) Shift from an Exception-Riddled “Rule” to a Context-Dependent
“Standard”: As the exceptions and limitations become entrenched,
courts eventually acknowledge that the old “rule” has evolved into a
context-dependent “standard” (e.g., “endorsement” or “undue
burden”). Standards are more flexible but less clear and predictable
than rules;216 the extent of the clarity and predictability problem
depends on whether the standard is (a) a clear, well-conceptualized
statement of principles and factors guiding future cases or (b) a
vague statement purporting to explain recent precedents but not
helping to resolve future cases. Unfortunately, after years of
precedents purporting to adhere to the strict rule even as that rule lost
its force, the emerging new standard is far more likely to be the latter
than the former. That is, courts resolve their ambivalence about the
old rule by adopting an unhelpful standard whose main appeal is that
it is vague and indeterminate enough to be arguably consistent with
both (a) the old strict rule and (b) the newer exceptions.
Given these similarities, abortion and Establishment Clause jurisprudence are
216
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cautionary tales for employment law: unless courts adopt clear, well-defined
principles for adopting certain limitations to employment at will, the evolving
doctrine may remain murky and unpredictable for a long time.
IV. BUILDING A BETTER STANDARD: SOME ECONOMIC THINKING ABOUT
HOW TO RECOGNIZE EXCEPTIONS TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL WITHOUT
INVITING INCOHERENCE
To recap, employment at will is undergoing a three-stage process
culminating in doctrinal incoherence:
(1) Employment at will is on the decline as a categorical “rule,” with
recently established common law termination claims arising as
significant exceptions.
(2) Despite its decline, the at-will doctrine is not being replaced by a
general requirement of “just cause” for all terminations, as some
have speculated.
(3) State recognition of these common law termination claims (the
exceptions to employment at will) has been haphazard and
inconsistent, with courts ambivalent about employment at will:
unwilling to comply with the harsh pure form of the doctrine;
unwilling to reject it entirely; and unable to find any consistency as
to what exceptions to recognize.
Given this incoherence, employment common law is crying out for a wellconceptualized basis for either accepting or rejecting proposed modifications of
the pure employment-at-will rule.
A full comparison of the normative appeal of employment at will and a just
cause requirement is beyond the scope of this Article; that debate has raged for
years, in many lengthy articles focused on that point.217 This section discusses a
more limited normative question: Given that courts’ selective adoption of
employment-at-will exceptions has engendered incoherence, is there a way to
provide legal redress for workplace unfairness without inviting doctrinal
anarchy?
Part (A) discusses the most obvious solution, the only real “rule” amidst all
the “standards”: eliminating all employment claims, and returning to pure
employment at will. Recent scholarship supports an argument that informal
social norms and free-market incentives adequately deter unjust terminations,
rendering employment litigation unnecessary. Part (A), however, notes that
while social norms can be quite powerful, economic and behavioral economic
analysis shows them to have certain systematic weaknesses. Labor markets are a
217
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classic setting in which social norms have limited power, so legal exceptions to
the pure employment-at-will rule remain necessary. Pure employment at will is
the only categorically clear “rule” among the options, so if that is not the
solution, then the remaining alternatives are context-dependent “standards.”
The tough road ahead is to find a standard less ad hoc and arbitrary than the
status quo of adopting and rejecting various claims without any consistent
rationale. One option would be a universal “just cause” rule; that once was a
popular cause, but aside from Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act,218 “[t]he Model Employment Termination Act (META) . . . [of] 1991 has
not been adopted, or even seriously considered, by any state.”219 Even
Montana’s law is not a true “just cause” standard: courts broadly interpret
“legitimate business reasons” for termination to “take into account the right of an
employer to exercise discretion over who[m] it will employ”; even modest
economic imperatives like “reduction in warehouse inventory” can constitute
legitimate business reasons.220 Thus, Montana’s statute, which represents the far
extreme of states’ willingness to restrict employment at will, is not so radical, not
nearly as strong a guarantee of job security as the meatier “just cause” provisions
common in collective bargaining agreements.221 As meaningful “just cause”
legislation is a cause with little past and no immediate future, serious discussion
of reform must look elsewhere.
Part (B) discusses more realistic alternatives to pure employment at will and
a universal “just cause” regime. Advocating for courts to recognize various
employment claims without devolving into unprincipled ad hoccery, Part (B)
focuses on two theoretical grounds for allowing legal claims challenging some,
but not all, allegedly unjust terminations: (1) the limits of social norms; and (2) a
broad conception of public policy that includes protecting the core bargains
struck by employers and employees against the opportunism that sequential
218
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performance risks. More traditional “fairness”-based rationales would support a
challenge to just about any allegedly unfair termination; in contrast, this Part’s
theoretical structure advises courts to recognize only certain specific claims, like
the three discussed in this Article: discharge in violation of public policy;
fraudulent inducement of employees; and termination depriving deferred
compensation in violation of an implied covenant of good faith. This normative
recommendation has several advantages: it is realistic; it would be a substantial
improvement on the status quo of doctrinal incoherence; and it would be
consistent with long-term and recent trends in expanding employment rights.
A. Social Norms Against Unfair Terminations: A Real Phenomenon, But
An Inadequate Substitute for Legal Protections
If the problem is doctrinal incoherence, then the first solution that comes to
mind is the clearest rule: pure employment at will, with no exceptions. Regularly
rejected as too harsh, pure employment at will has drawn new support from
scholarship extolling the virtues of social norms as a substitute for lawsuits based
on enforceable legal doctrines. This section acknowledges that social norms
occasionally can create “order without law,” as the title of the seminal book in
the field states – but not always. Based on economic and behavioral economic
analysis, this section argues that employment markets have several key
characteristics of settings in which social norms can be quite weak: “cheating”
(violating the norm) at times is quite profitable; the penalties for cheating often
are limited; cheating is unlikely to be “caught” due to information limitations
endemic to workplaces and employees; and the social norm itself is weak, in that
it is far from clear and universal. Given the weakness of social norms in
employment, norms are no substitute for lawsuits based on legal rights.
1. Is Law Unnecessary? Social Norms and Free Markets as
Guarantors of Fairness and Efficiency
Contemporary observations about the previously unrecognized power of
social norms trace back to Robert Ellickson’s groundbreaking book, “Order
Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes,” an extensive discussion of a rural
county where informal norms, not tort law, prevent and redress civil wrongs such
as trespass and property damage among cattle ranchers.222 Informal enforcement
of social norms against “cheaters” (e.g., those who do not pay voluntarily for
property damage they cause), without any recourse to litigation or police power,
worked because in the tight-knit rural community, “members transact visibly
(and so cannot cheat . . . easily) and are interdependent (and therefore subject to
punishment for cheating).”223
222
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In the past decade, legal scholars persuasively have found various settings,
not just Shasta County, to be governed by social norms, which can be defined
briefly as “nonlegal rules of behavior that are enforced by private individuals
through social sanctions such as gossip and ostracism,”224 or defined at greater
length as follows:
A social norm . . . is a rule that is neither promulgated by an official
source, such as a court or legislature, nor enforced by threat of legal
sanctions, yet is regularly complied with. . . . The rules of etiquette,
including norms of proper dress and table manners; the rules of
grammar; standard business practices; and customary law in . . . private
associations are all examples of social norms.225
For example, Dan Kahan has noted that while sudden, dramatic new laws (“hard
shoves” to social norms) can backfire by triggering widespread resistance (e.g.,
the 1920s prohibition of alcohol, or excessive punishment of low-level marijuana
use today),226 more modest adjustments to the law (e.g., limited smoking bans)227
are more promising. Because of their reasonableness, they quite effectively serve
as “gentle nudges” to social norms, inducing widespread compliance and
ultimately changing people’s perceptions of what is and is not proper behavior
(e.g., smoking in enclosed spaces).
More recently, many have argued that the power of social norms “casts doubt
on whether law is the most efficient means of social control[,] . . . [because]
social groups often ‘opt out’ of the legal system in favor of pursuing informal
mechanisms of social control such as gossip, shunning, mediation, and selfhelp.”228 In this vein, Jesse Rudy has argued that a “just cause” rule is
unnecessary, because Ellicksonian social norms will prevent most workplace
unfairness.229 Survey data show most employees to be unaware of the
employment-at-will rule; most think they have “termination only for cause”
protection.230 While many see this data as undercutting employment at will,
197, 200-01 (1998).
224
Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Take on Shasta County and the “New Chicago School,” 15 YALE J.
L. & HUMAN. 295, 295 (2003).
225
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226
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Rudy looks at the data showing a relatively low number of arbitrary
terminations231 and argues another interpretation:
[T]he low number of arbitrary discharges [shows] that “no discharge
without cause” is a “norm”232 . . . . [L]egal protection is unnecessary
because the norm provides adequate protection for employees, even in
the absence of the law.233 . . . [E]mployers feel constrained not to fire at
will even though they are legally permitted to do so.234
In line with Ellickson’s analysis of informal, interpersonal “enforcement” of
social norms, Rudy notes that employers may be deterred from violating the “no
discharge without cause” norm by the consequences of violating the norm with
an unjust termination:
If the employer violates the norm often, she may be subject to feelings of
guilt and, more importantly, to non-legal sanctions from her employees. .
. . Current employees may begin to look for alternative employment and
gossip that the employer is a bad actor may spread among current
employees as well as to prospective job applicants[,] . . . put[ting] the
employer at a disadvantage when competing to hire and retain top
employees. On the other hand, if the employer follows the “no discharge
without cause” norm consistently, her employees will be encouraged to
make greater investments in the employment relationship than they
would with less job security.235
Rudy’s analysis adds the persuasive power of modern social norm theory to
the older free-market economic arguments that widespread employer unfairness
is both unlikely and untroubling. “One tendency of competitive markets is to
drive out inefficient forms of behavior, with discrimination as with anything
else,” Richard Epstein notes; employers that reject good employees for personal
reasons (e.g., discrimination or personal animosity) are sacrificing valuable

Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997) (surveying unemployed
workers and concluding, “this study raises serious doubts about whether workers have the most
basic information necessary for understanding the terms on which they have contracted. . . . For
example, although the common law rule clearly permits an employer to terminate an at-will
employee out of personal dislike, so long as no discriminatory motive is involved, an
overwhelming majority of the respondents--89%--erroneously believe that the law forbids such a
discharge,” id. at 110-111); Rudy, supra note 229 (replicating Kim’s results with incumbent
employees).
231
Rudy, supra note 229, at 342-43, 346.
232
Id. at 344.
233
Id. at 345.
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Id. at 346.
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Id. at 348.
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productivity and thereby placing themselves at a competitive disadvantage.236
Enforceable legal rules may be unnecessary to police labor markets, the
argument goes, because of the power of social norms to discipline employer
misbehavior, as well as the power of the free market to discipline such inefficient
behavior. Wrongful terminations cannot be a common phenomenon in a
competitive free market, according to these theories, and when they occur,
employers pay a price for mistreating workers. That “price” is an example of
social norms, and the free market, deterring and redressing workplace unfairness.
2. Interpreting the Survey Data and Lawyers’ Experiences: Social
Norms Against Unfair Terminations
Rudy is at his most persuasive when interpreting the survey data as
evidencing a social norm that employers terminate only for just cause.237 His
survey data, and the similar earlier survey by Pauline Kim,238 show that strong
majorities of at-will employees hold the flatly incorrect view that they enjoy “just
cause” protection against termination:
The mistakes made by Kim’s and my own respondents . . . represent a
systematic over-estimation of the amount of job security afforded
employees by the law. . . . [E]mployees are almost four times as likely to
incorrectly believe that a lawful discharge is unlawful as they are to
incorrectly believe that an unlawful discharge is lawful, indicating a
strong over-estimation of job security. . . . Employees erroneously
believe that the law prevents employers from discharging them in a wide
variety of situations where the law does not protect them.239
Many have argued, even before this survey data, that widespread employee
ignorance militates in favor of jettisoning employment at will, because the
doctrine is dangerously out-of-step with public sentiment and employeremployee understandings of their contractual relationships.240 Rudy, however,
236
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looked closely at the data and reached a different conclusion. In both his and
Kim’s studies, managerial employees were just as ill-informed as anyone:
“responsibility for hiring and firing other employees had no measurable effect on
. . . perceptions of the law, . . . [which] may indicate that employers similarly are
confused about the at-will default rule or that they have chosen not to give their
agents the freedom to discharge other employees at-will for one reason or
another.”241 If most employers, who either know the at-will rule or could learn it
without much difficulty as part of their business,242 will not fire without just
cause, then employees’ beliefs that they will not be fired except for cause
actually are accurate. Employer and employee beliefs reflect not the state of the
law, but a prevalent norm that employees be fired only for just cause.
Confirming Rudy’s hypothesis of a social norm against unfair terminations
are the experiences of labor and employment lawyers – evidence that is
anecdotal, but (like most qualitative evidence) allows for deeper scrutiny than
simple polling.243 Employees consulting lawyers consistently express shock that
the law allows them to be terminated for virtually any reason, even an “unfair”
one;244 this ignorance extends to even white-collar managerial employees, who
often think they neither can fire nor can be fired without just cause.245
(focusing on employee ignorance not of the law, but of the odds of a future termination, to argue
that “[w]hen . . . inadequate access to information prevents parties from properly valuing the
benefits of job security, judicial intervention is justified to ensure a more efficient result”).
241
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242
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Reciprocally, employees’ attorneys admit that employers terminating at-will
employees for permissible reasons sometimes offer surprisingly generous
severance packages, well out of proportion with the low odds of a frivolous
lawsuit forcing them to pay attorney’s fees or (even less likely) an eventual
verdict.246 Both possible explanations for generous severance offers, purely
emotional generosity or purely rational investing in a reputation for fairness, are
classic examples of compliance with social norms of fairness.
3. Employment Norms as Case Study in the Limits of Social Norms:
What Makes Some Norms Powerful, Others Weak?
Even if survey and anecdotal data show a social norm against unfair
terminations, there remains the critical question of how powerful that social norm
is. If a social norm is weak, providing little disincentive to deviant behavior,
then it is no substitute for legal enforcement. More broadly, the observation
“there is a social norm” just raises the more complicated and more interesting
question: in what markets, and under what circumstances, are social norms
powerful and reliable enough to obviate the need for legal enforcement?
This question is fundamental to any application of social norms.
Employment markets have proven a fertile ground for examining contemporary
economic theories, such as behavioral economics247 and the interplay of feminist
theory and economic theory.248 Employment markets are an equally promising
subject matter for examining the power of social norms, because they feature
many of the characteristics that can make social norms weak: (1) limited
information flow and biased information processing, which make norm violations
they can’t fire or be fired without good cause, because they’ve been told by Human Resources
officials that they have to have a good reason and that they have to document, go through
progressive discipline, etc.”).
246
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hard to spot; (2) difficulty of valuing assets (workers), which limits the cost to an
employer of being “shunned” by workers; and (3) highly profitable opportunities
for employers to “cheat.” This analysis has implications well beyond
employment law, because it is generalizable: In any markets with characteristics
similar to these features of employment markets – limited information, hard-tovalue assets, and profitable opportunities to violate the norm – social norms may
be quite weak, and thus poor substitutes for legally binding rules.
Finally, with social norms, as with so many other things, the devil is in the
details: certain features of the “no termination without just cause” social norm
severely hamper its strength. Unlike many norms, this norm (1) may not be
universal, (2) is the exactly opposite of the default legal rule (employment at
will), and (3) allows parties to “opt out” (i.e., when employers expressly state
that employment is at will in a contract or handbook). These features limit the
norm’s binding nature and potential for punishment.
a. Characteristics of Employment Markets That Weaken
Termination Norms
i.

Limited Cost to Employers of Violating Norms

To an employer, the main cost of violating a norm against unfair terminations
is that it can “put the employer at a disadvantage when competing to hire and
retain top employees.”249 For some jobs, there are substantial, measurable
differences in employee performance or talent (e.g., lawyer billable hours or
revenue; retailers’ sales made), so losing out on better employees is a real cost to
employers. But for many jobs, the cost may be minimal, because the difference
between the worker fired and his or her replacement may be minimal, either (a)
because for the job in question there is no meaningful difference between most
employees (e.g., certain low-skill jobs) or (b) because the differences are hard for
employers to spot or measure (a common and much-noted problem of limited
employer information about worker quality250). Thus, in the reality of
uncertainty-filled labor markets, the free-market economics analogy between
labor markets and capital markets – that an inefficient termination is like passing
249

Rudy, supra note 229, at 348.
See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 158 (8th ed.
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up a valuable asset and therefore cannot occur very often – may not hold up .251
Moreover, many employment markets feature surplus labor, whether because
of an economic downturn, depressed economic conditions, or the prevalence of
above-market “efficiency wages” that employers use (primarily when it is costly
to scrutinize workers) to motivate employees and generate a large applicant
pool.252 With workers in large supply, employers suffer little when they upset
some workers by violating termination norms.
If unjustified terminations cost employers little, then they will not destroy a
company’s competitive position any more than the litany of other commonplace
economically inefficient corporate behaviors, such as nepotism, charitable giving
(in excess of what is necessary for public relations), or above-market executive
compensation. These are common phenomena among successful businesses even
though all may be economically inefficient, in the narrow economic sense of
sacrificing profits. Such inefficiencies may be common, because institutions
often suffer a “principal-agent problem[,] . . . that managers may pursue their
own goals, even at the cost of obtaining lower profits for owners.”253 The selfinterested manager does not fear getting caught because “owners can’t monitor
everything that employees do” and therefore cannot “ensure that their managers .
. . [are] working effectively” in making day-to-day decisions such as hiring and
firing lower-level employees.254 Terminations that are not only unfair but
inefficient may be just one of many minor inefficiencies that companies suffer
with regularity. Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that free-market
competitive pressures will meaningfully penalize companies for terminations that
are inefficient or violate social norms.
ii. Limited & Biased Information Flow
When an employer violates a termination norm by firing a worker unfairly, it
will pay the price in reputation only if others learn what it did. It is dubious
251

See John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination in Perspective: Three Concepts of
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57, 60-61, 78 (1998) (noting that, by design, efficiency wages yield a “surplus of equally
competent” workers); see generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 250, at 359-62; PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 17.6 at 616-18 (5th ed. 2001); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
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the cost to the agent of being caught shirking or misbehaving). Efficiency wages may well have
existed for a long time and in a wide range of sectors of the economy, such as on Henry Ford’s
early automobile production line. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra, at 361.
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whether news of an unfair termination always spreads widely enough to hurt an
employer’s reputation.255 Economists and legal scholars alike note that
“information about job opportunities . . . is imperfect,” especially for job
applicants and new workers.256 But even for longtime workers, information
about who was fired (and especially about why) can be limited and unreliable,
because nefarious motives usually are covert; “‘[e]mployers are rarely so
cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file’ that the firing is for a
reason forbidden by law”257 or by an established social norm. The employer
unfairly firing someone always will assert a legitimate-sounding, performancebased reason, and the truth will be hard to spot. Especially in the many jobs in
which performance evaluation is subjective, it is hard to assess whether the
employer’s asserted reason for the firing is pretextual.258 It may be easy for the
employer to find another worker just as qualified (or better qualified) when there
is a labor surplus in the relevant employment market, which is often the case.259
Thus, it often will be difficult for workers to know whether a firing was unfair,
unlawful, or (as the employer asserts) legitimately based on performance.
The main costs to employers of violating a social norm against unfair
terminations are that (1) new employees will be harder to recruit and (2) valued
existing employees will suffer lower morale and be harder to retain.260 The
second cost, lower employee morale or retention, may be especially limited
because the most valued current employees, the high-morale and highperforming “star” employees, are especially unlikely to be receptive to negative
information about the employer. Star employees are likely to think well of their
employer, likely to be skeptical when told that the employer fired someone
unfairly. That skepticism may be exaggerated because of the “confirmation
bias,”261 the tendency for people to be “not equally open to all information, but
255

See Robert C. Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to Litowitz, 15 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 333, 334 (2003) (noting that “the legal system became more influential,” and social norms
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more open to that which comfortably confirms their views, more inclined to spin
disconfirming evidence to fit those views, and more apt to seek confirmatory
facts and opinions actively.”262 Presented a less-than-iron-clad story of employer
unfairness, a star employee will be a tough sell. Moreover, high-morale
employees often are high-performing employees, because their high morale may
stem from the employer’s praise of their performance or their pleasure in doing
their job well. Thus, the star employees that employers most fear losing are least
likely to believe negative rumors about their employers’ termination practices,
which further limits the power of social norms to discipline employers.
iii. Profitable Cheating: When Violating Norms is Worth the
Cost
While the cost of violating the social norm is limited (as discussed above), in
certain situations the dollar benefit to the employer of violating the norm may be
high. Certain “unfair” terminations are instances of highly profitable employer
opportunism, such as firing an employee to save money or avoid other significant
exposure.263 Especially given the limited cost of violating the norm264 and the
limited odds that an employer violation will become sufficiently widely known to
harm the employer’s reputation,265 it is entirely likely that there will be situations
in which violating the norm will be worth the cost to the employer. Ellickson
made this point with regard to Shasta County,266 and Rudy concedes this in
noting why some exceptions to the employment-at-will rule may be appropriate,
though he pleads agnosticism about which exceptions are warranted.267
If employers terminate without cause only when doing so would be
to a numerical pattern, they skew their interpretation of subsequent evidence in straining to
preserve the initial guess).
262
Moss & Malin, supra note 223, at 208.
263
See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing how employers often profit greatly from breaching norms in
ways that would violate public policy, would amount to fraudulent inducement, or would violate
implied covenants regarding deferred compensation).
264
See supra Part IV.A.3.a.i.
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especially profitable, then the relative rarity of these events exacerbates the
“information flow” problem:268 there will not be enough “data points” in the
rumor mill to confirm that the employer does not comply with termination
norms. Thus, if employers are relatively restrained, violating termination norms
only when especially profitable, then such terminations easily may be worth the
cost. This may well be how employers behave, as evidenced by the data Rudy
cites about the possibly rarity of unfair terminations.269
b. Characteristics of “Just Cause for Termination” Making it a
Weak Norm
The preceding discussion illustrated that even if a norm of just cause for
termination exists, that norm would be quite weak due to myriad characteristics
of employment markets: the limited cost to employers of violating the norm; the
limited likelihood that the employer’s violation will become sufficiently known
for the employer to pay any sizeable reputational cost; and the profitability to
employers of “cheating” on those norms. In addition to those characteristics of
employment markets, there also are three characteristics of the particular social
norm that make it weak: (1) limited consensus as to the norm; (2) conflict
between the norm and the law; and (3) employer ability to “opt out” of the norm.
i.

A Non-Consensus Norm?

On the one hand, Kim’s and Rudy’s survey data show many employees and
employers believing that employees cannot be fired without just cause. On the
other hand, this belief is far from universal: as many as 4 in 10 (depending on the
subgroup and the particular question) recognized the legality of a termination
without just cause. Granted, some of those 4 in 10 may nevertheless believe that
unfair terminations violate workplace “norms”; but we do not really know. The
survey evidence therefore cannot be conclusive proof of a norm held more than
about 60%. Truly strong social norms, such as those against trespassing and
property damage in Shasta County, are nearly universal. They had better be, if a
violation is to generate the widespread social sanctions that make norms
powerful. The employment survey evidence simply does not let us conclude that
there is a sufficiently universal termination norm.
ii. A Norm Flatly Contrary to the Law?
Ellickson’s Shasta County norms had another strength that a termination
norm lacks. Norms against trespassing and damaging property are broadly
consistent with the law, even if the details of the norm and the law may vary
(e.g., a norm of strict liability, “pay for damage you cause,” even if the law is less
categorical). Indeed, the substantial overlap between the norm and the law was
268
269
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why Ellickson was struck by how rarely Shasta County neighbors sued each
other: social norms served not so much to provide a different rule as to provide a
different enforcement means. Informal social sanctions replaced litigation as
Shasta County’s preferred means of enforcing society’s rules.
In contrast, in an employment-at-will legal regime with a “just cause
termination” norm, the norm is exactly contrary to the law. This conflict limits
the norm’s power. The level of moral opprobrium for violating a norm is weaker
when the norm violation is not also illegal. Moreover, the conflict creates
confusion: the answer to “can they fire you without just cause” is not a simple
yes or no, because the answer is different depending on whether we are talking
about the law or the norm.270 Indeed, this norm/law confusion may help explain
Kim’s and Rudy’s survey results.
iii. An “Opt-Out” Norm?
Finally, a truly strong social norm is mandatory. Ranchers in Shasta County
do not contract ex ante for the right to violate the norm; Ellickson does not report
of subgroups of ranchers who decide to be governed by the legal default rules
rather than by the local social norms. In contrast, major employers often
expressly tell their employees ex ante (i.e., at the start of their employment, well
in advance of any termination) that their employment is at-will.271 While many
employees may not understand such disclaimers, that ignorance is far from
universal.272 Is a social norm really violated by a termination in compliance with
at least formally agreed-upon, and certainly disclosed, “at-will” terms of
employment? It might, but perhaps not with the same level of moral opprobrium
as a termination by an employer not expressly providing for employment at will.
There simply is not a good analogue to this “opting out” of social norms in
settings like Shasta County where social norms have true strength.
B. Toward a More Coherent and Just Standard: Recognizing a Wide
Range of Claims Based on the Limits of Social Norms and a Broad
Economic Conception of Public Policy
With social norms an inadequate substitute for legally enforceable restraints
on unjust terminations, the only truly clear and categorical “rule” on the table
(pure employment at will, no exceptions) is no solution to the problem of
incoherent doctrine. Accordingly, the only real options all are “standards”; the
choice is simply between standards that are more predictable and principled, and
those that are less so. The chaotic status quo falls decidedly into the “less so”
270
See supra note 245 (noting managers’ confusion of legal standards and norms about human
resources practices).
271
Verkerke, supra note 17, at 867-70.
272
See supra Part IV.A.3.b.i (noting that a substantial minority of employees do know and
understand their at-will status).
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category; the order of business is to find a standard with a more principled basis
for allowing challenges to some, but not all, allegedly unfair terminations.
This Part suggests that courts can retain employment at will but recognize the
three major common law employment claims: discharge in violation of public
policy; fraudulent inducement of employees; and termination depriving deferred
compensation in violation of an implied covenant of good faith. There are two
theoretical grounds for allowing these legal claims: (1) the limits of social norms;
and (2) a broad conception of public policy that includes protecting the core
bargains struck by employers and employees against the opportunism that
sequential performance risks. This perspective differs from more traditional
rationales for extra-contractual protections, such as moral outrage: whether a
certain kind of employment action is “unconscionable” in the sense of being
“shocking to the conscience, monstrously harsh, and exceedingly calloused.”273
Such purely fairness-based rationales threaten a slippery slope – why not allow
challenges to all allegedly “unfair” terminations? – not presented by this Part’s
specific theoretical basis for allowing certain but not all employment claims.
1. The Limits of Social Norms
Employers are especially unlikely to be deterred from the sorts of misdeeds
covered by the three relevant legal doctrines (public policy, fraudulent
inducement, and implied covenants regarding compensation), because those
misdeeds can be greatly profitable.
• Public Policy Claims: An employer can avoid substantial regulatory
or other headaches by firing an employee to prevent her from halting
or blowing the whistle on unlawful employer activities (e.g., polluting
to avoid environmental compliance costs).274 Even if the
whistleblower already has blown the whistle, a retaliatory termination
can deter other employees from cooperating in the ensuing
investigation or engaging in their own whistleblowing. Social norms
cannot be counted on to deter an employer from firing an employee
whose activities pose a serious threat to the employer.
• Implied Covenant Claims: Terminating an employee just before the
due date of compensation, in violation of the “implied covenant of
good faith,” is another example of employer opportunism too
profitable to be deterred by social norms alone. Firing an employee
273
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just before his or her productive sales efforts yield a sizeable bonus or
commission payment can save the employer substantial sums.275
• Fraudulent Inducement Claims: Similarly, an employer also can
realize significant financial gains by backing off expensive promises
made to recruit or retain workers.276 (Additionally, social norms are
likely to be weak against fraudulent inducement because the
employee does not suffer a termination – the employment event most
likely to generate the moral outrage necessary for social norms to
impact the employer’s reputation.)
In contrast, social norms are more likely to redress certain more commonplace
acts of workplace unfairness, such as firing a worker due to minor personality
conflicts or nepotism, which do not promise such great gains for the employer.277
The limits of social norms therefore support recognizing legal claims against
certain kinds of employer misdeeds that, if not redressed, can be especially
profitable to employers, at least the unscrupulous ones who need some form of
deterrence to do the right thing.
2. An Economic Conception of Public Policy: Externalities and
Sequential Performance
In addition to the limits of social norms, the commonalities of the three
claims support recognizing all of them. Facially, the three claims seem to have
little in common. Public policy claims are justified by the public interest,
whereas the other two are really extra-contractual protections for one of the two
parties. Moreover, fraudulent inducement claims are not even termination
claims, like the other two.
Yet at a higher level of abstraction, all three are unified as protections of the
public interest, as an economic analysis would define “public interest.” Public
policy claims clearly reflect the public interest, not only because they exist to
protect public legislation from being subverted, but also in an economic sense:
public policy claims exist to prevent externalities, i.e., negative effects on third
parties.278 When an employer fires an employee for complying with a public
duty, for example, the harm goes beyond the parties (i.e., beyond employer and
275
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employee); the harm extends to all those who benefit from that pubic duty,
whether pollution controls, safety regulations, jury duty, etc. Preventing parties
from freely imposing negative externalities is a classic economic rationale for
government intervention to remedy the market failure of ignoring costs imposed
on others;279 it provides a strong justification for limiting a laissez faire, freemarket doctrine like employment at will.
Less obviously, a properly robust economic analysis would define the public
interest sufficiently broadly to justify extra-contractual protections against
fraudulent inducement and implied covenant claims. In both claims, the problem
is that the employees must perform their end of the bargain first: in the implied
covenant situation, making the sales generating the commissions; in the
fraudulent inducement context, accepting the new job or declining to leave for a
new job opportunity. After performing first, however, the employees must hope
their employers perform their own end of the bargain: paying the commissions
(implied covenant); and delivering on the promises that induced the employee to
start or remain on the job (fraudulent inducement).
In terms of economic incentives, implied covenant and fraudulent
inducement cases reflect classic problems of ensuring sequential performance.
As Richard Posner explains, “the problem of contract opportunism arises from
the sequential character of economic activity”: the party performing first is
vulnerable to reneging by the later-performing party.280 Without expressly citing
law-and-economics lingo, the case law reflects similar logic.281 The leading
implied covenant case of Wakefield, for example, distinguished the situation of
the plaintiff, an at-will employee terminated to deprive him of commissions,
from the more typical at-will context, where “even a whimsical termination does
not deprive the employee of benefits expected in return for the employee’s
performance[,] … because performance and the distribution of benefits occur
simultaneously, and neither party is left high and dry by the termination.”282
The public policy at stake is a significant one, economically speaking:
protecting employees’ trust that their employers will not renege on delayed
performance, such as paying commissions or complying with representations
inducing employment. Without such protections, employees would have to
279
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assume some risk of reneging, which would make them less likely to enter into
relationships featuring sequential performance. Posner notes that “the absence of
legally enforceable rights would bias investment toward economic activities that
could be completed in a short time; and this would reduce efficiency.”
Employment markets would suffer exactly this sort of short-term bias without
implied covenant or fraudulent inducement protections. Employees would be
less likely (or, identically, would demand a premium) to accept deferred
compensation deals or to accept employer representations inducing their
employment. Diminished employee acceptance of such deals would be a
substantial inefficiency: deferred compensation schemes often are desirable
because they can help employers structure employee incentives efficiently (e.g.,
higher compensation for better salespeople) and may offer tax advantage;283 and
employees’ uncertainty-filled job decisions are more efficient when they can rely
upon employer representations about the job and the company. The traditional
way to assure sequential performance is a contract specifying the laterperforming party’s duties in detail,284 but that is often not feasible in these
employment contexts. Contractual assurances of job security might be feasible
as a way to assure deferred compensation, but that would mean that deferred
compensation is possible only for non-at-will employees, which would not
protect most workers. Neither are contractual assurances a feasible way to
prevent fraudulent inducement; in many of the fraudulent inducement cases, the
disputed representations are about the employer’s imminent plans and impending
deals,285 which the employer may be understandably reluctant to memorialize in
writing for various reasons, such as fear of risking premature public disclosure,
or the difficulty of reducing to writing a fluid “best efforts” type of promise to
procure more deals for the party’s benefit.286 Broadly speaking, these
employment situations are examples of contexts in which the cost or
impracticability of drafting contract provisions is prohibitive. Prohibitive
contract drafting costs are a classic economic rationale for courts to recognize
extra-contractual protections, to protect material expectations that the parties
could not reduce to writing.287
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In short, there is a substantial public policy interest underlying all three of
these common law claims. While public policy claims aim to prevent
externalities, perhaps the most traditionally recognized rationale for intervening
in a free market, both implied covenant and fraudulent inducement claims serve
the public interest as well. Both are necessary to minimize the risk of
opportunism inherent in relationships involving sequential performance.
Minimizing that risk has an important economic efficiency justification:
encouraging trust in long-term economic relationships. Accordingly, there is a
public interest justifying recognition of all three common law claims, even as
courts otherwise retain employment at will and decline to allow employees to
challenge any and all terminations as “unjust.”
V. CONCLUSION: EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, PAST AND FUTURE
This Article discusses why various common law employment claims can and
should draw wider recognition, despite the employment-at-will rule. Failing to
recognize them leaves employees vulnerable to terminations undercutting
important public policies; and the courts’ spotty recognition of some but not all
claims has left employment law regrettably incoherent. One final note is that,
broadly speaking, recognizing all of these common law claims is consistent with
the trend in the past century of employment law: maintaining employment at will
but broadening the classes of workers protected from termination.
Even the New York Court of Appeals, a staunch defender of employment at
will, noted that “the twentieth century featured significant statutory inroads into
the presumption of at-will employment, most notably with passage of the
National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] in 1935 and [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.”288 Yet by so simplifying, the court understated the trend of
“significant inroads.” The NLRA and Title VII just brought certain
constitutional rights into the private sector – the NLRA, freedom from retaliation
for union members’ speech and association; Title VII and similar laws,
discrimination protections for “discrete and insular minorities.”289 Only much
more recently have employment rights gone substantially beyond such
Posner) (deeming contracts to contain “implied conditions” or “good faith” duties are “ways of
formulating the overriding purpose of contract law, which is to give the parties what they would
have stipulated for expressly if at the time of making the contract they had had complete knowledge
of the future and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the contract had been zero.”);
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 252, § 4.1 at 104 (noting that one function of
contract law is “filling out the parties’ agreement by interpolating missing clauses. This function
too is related to the sequential character of contract performance. The longer their performance
will take – and remember that ‘performance’ includes the entire stream of future services . . . – the
harder it will be for the parties to foresee the various contingencies that might affect performance”).
288
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fundamental constitutional principles, mainly in the 1990s and early 2000s.290
Recent employment protections have proscribed discriminating against
employees in vulnerable positions due to a temporary or volitional status that
Constitution protects little or not at all:291 (1) disabilities and medical leave
needs292 – often a temporary (or at least suddenly arising) condition; (2)
whistleblowing by employees293 – entirely a matter of choice by the employee;
and (3) sexual orientation294 – which may be innate, but much of the relevant
“discrimination” is based on the employee’s choice to be “out of the closet.”
Progressives looking for “the next thing” in employment rights have missed
the boat in advocating, or predicting, that employment at will be replaced by a
requirement of just cause for termination. “The next thing” is not a just-cause
requirement. Rather, it is an expansion of the range of employees protected from
termination. We already have moved through three stages of employment
290
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ADA (1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the FMLA (1994), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.
291
See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1119 n.333 (1995) (noting that under the Equal Protection Clause, “the
Court has accorded strict or intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on race, gender, ethnicity,
illegitimacy, and alienage. However, other groups that represent vulnerable populations have not
been given the same protection. These include groups based on age, sexual orientation, and
disabilities.”) (citations omitted).
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See supra note 296 (discussing ADA and FMLA).
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See supra Part II.A.1 (common law doctrine of discharge in violation of public policy); Noah P.
Peeters, Don't Raise That Hand: Why, Under Georgia's Anti-Slapp Statute, Whistleblowers Should
Find Protection from Reprisals for Reporting Employer Misconduct, 38 GA. L. REV. 769 (2004)
(noting that “Congress has chosen to enact a number of specific statutory protections for employee
whistleblowers over the past fifty years,” id. at 792, and listing many such laws, e.g., “When it
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the summer of 2002, Congress enacted new whistleblower
protections for those reporting corporate misconduct. . . . These protections include a prohibition on
employers using discharge, demotion, suspension, threat, harassment, or any other manner of
discrimination against an employee who provides information or otherwise assists an investigation
regarding certain securities frauds at publicly traded companies,” id. at 792 n.160 (citing SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 204, 116 Stat. 745, codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A)).
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E.g., Ryan E. Mensing, A New York State of Mind: Reconciling Legislative Incrementalism with
Sexual Orientation Jurisprudence, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2004) (recounting the 31-year
journey from bill to law of New York’s “Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Act” (“SONDA”),
which took effect in January 2003; “The practical effect of SONDA's passage was to add ‘sexual
orientation’ to New York State's already existing civil rights law,” which forbid discrimination “in
housing, employment, credit, or public accommodations.”).
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common law: (1) pure at-will employment; (2) protection of constitutional
values; and then (3) protection of temporary vulnerabilities (e.g., medical) and
choices society deems deserving of respect, whether based on the public interest
(e.g., whistleblowing) or respect for autonomy (e.g., sexual orientation).295
Broadening employment protections to include the common law claims that
courts inconsistently have started recognizing over the past few decades (public
policy, implied covenant, and fraudulent inducement) is consistent with this third
stage in the evolution of employment law. The early employment rights statutes
were right to focus on core constitutional principles such as free speech and
race/gender discrimination. But courts and legislatures should continue along the
path they have chosen, albeit only implicitly: that the next step for employment
rights is to expand protection of employees vulnerable to employer retaliation or
opportunism because of choices and temporary vulnerabilities that merit
society’s protection.
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Cf. Ballam, supra note 14, at 686 (noting and advocating trend toward employee rights to
“maximum ability to make free choices with no negative consequences from their employers).

